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In 2008, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. turned forty.  In Jones, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held for the first time that Congress can use its enforcement 
power under the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, to 
prohibit private racial discrimination in the sale of property.   
Jones temporarily awoke the Thirteenth Amendment and its enforcement 
legislation—the Civil Rights Act of 1866—from a century-long slumber.  
Moreover, it recognized an economic reality:  racial discrimination by 
private actors can be as debilitating as racial discrimination by public 
actors.  In doing so, Jones veered away from three decades of civil rights 
doctrine—a doctrine that had focused primarily on the Fourteenth, rather 
than the Thirteenth, Amendment, and on public actors, rather than on 
private actors.  Further, by applying the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to private 
discrimination, Jones acknowledged the nineteenth-century roots of 
economic arguments that scholars use today to critique the relationship 
between private and public power.   
Yet, despite its importance, Jones largely has been relegated to a squib in 
textbooks.  Few scholars have attempted to analyze Jones in light of other, 
analogous types of discriminatory behavior by private groups—especially 
cartel behavior.  And, unlike more famous civil rights cases, like Brown v. 
Board of Education, almost nothing is written about the people of Jones—
the litigants, the lawyers, and the judges behind the caption.   
This Article addresses that neglect.  First, it ties economic theories about 
racial discrimination together with the history of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and its subsequent interpretation in Jones.  It explains how 
Congress’s exercise of Thirteenth Amendment power to govern private 
economic relationships during Reconstruction gave important, but 
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unacknowledged, intellectual credence to the antitrust movements of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Second, it explores the 
human story behind Jones, tracking the narrative of the Joneses, their 
counsel, the judges, and their lives after the decision.  Finally, it explains 
how Jones’s recognition of the interrelationship between public and private 
coercion can help scholars, lawmakers, and jurists define the contours of 
Thirteenth Amendment power.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Forty years ago, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,1 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that Congress can forbid a white homeowner from refusing to 
sell his house to a black purchaser.2  What was surprising about the decision 
was not its conclusion; by the end of 1968, it was clear to everyone that 
racial discrimination in housing was going to be a thing of the past.3  What 
 
 1. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 2. Id. at 443–44. 
 3. That year, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1968, including Title VIII, the 
Fair Housing Act. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 
3631 (2000)). 
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was surprising was how the Court came to its conclusion.  In Jones, the 
Court abandoned the customary Fourteenth Amendment/state-action civil 
rights paradigm4 that had dominated civil rights jurisprudence for the past 
quarter century.  Instead, the Court relied on a heretofore moribund 
Reconstruction-era statute—the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (1866 Act)5—and 
an equally derelict constitutional amendment—the Thirteenth.6  Most 
dramatic was the Court’s assertion that the right to acquire private property 
on the same terms as whites “can be impaired as effectively by ‘those who 
place property on the market’ as by the State itself.”7 
In the last thirty years, scholars have generated substantial literature that 
uses the tools of economic theory to examine antidiscrimination legislation 
and policy.  Scholars like Ian Ayres, Richard Epstein, Richard McAdams, 
and Daria Roithmayr have vigorously debated the policy and the prudence 
of antidiscrimination legislation with reference to notions of maximum 
welfare, optimum efficiency, and functional markets.8 
However, while these scholars focus on economic arguments for or 
against antidiscrimination law and policy, few scholars have linked 
economic theories with traditional approaches to statutory interpretation.  In 
particular, scholars seldom have explored whether the Reconstruction 
amendments and Reconstruction legislation reveal any congressional intent 
that they operate as market correctives.9 
This Article attempts to close that gap.  Jones was the first case to 
recognize expressly the functional reality that discrimination by collectives 
acting as private citizens can be as insidious and as debilitating as 
discrimination by public collectives acting as governments.10  In the late 
 
 4. See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 5. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 242 (2006) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2000)). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 7. Jones, 392 U.S. at 420–21 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33, 43 
(8th Cir. 1967)). 
 8. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); Ian 
Ayres, Market Power and Inequality:  A Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing When 
Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669 (2007); John J. Donohue III, Is Title 
VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986); Richard A. Epstein, The Status-Production 
Sideshow:  Why the Antidiscrimination Laws Are Still a Mistake, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1085 
(1995); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:  The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995); Richard A. Posner, 
The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987); Daria Roithmayr, 
Barriers to Entry:  A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination, 86 VA. L. REV. 727, 730–31 
(2000); Robert E. Thomas & Bruce Louis Rich, Under the Radar:  The Resistance of 
Promotion Biases to Market Economic Forces, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 301 (2005). 
 9. Among the exceptions is Professor Daria Roithmayr, who has written about housing 
segregation from the 1920s through the 1950s. See Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 
12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 197, 214–39 (2004).  Before that, one has to go back over half a 
century to find work on antitrust as antidiscrimination. See Philip Marcus, Civil Rights and 
the Antitrust Laws, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (1951); Note, Application of the Sherman Act to 
Housing Segregation, 63 YALE L.J. 1124 (1954). 
 10. Certainly, the Court’s decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), seemed to 
foreshadow this reality.  But Shelley, unlike Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., still was tied to its 
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1960s, detractors criticized Jones for lack of fidelity to history.11  More 
recently, Jones’s conclusion—that Congress may regulate purely private 
discrimination through its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power—has 
weathered Supreme Court scrutiny only by sheltering on the thin ice of 
stare decisis.12  Even today, Jones occupies a subordinate place in the civil 
rights canon, far below marquee cases such as Brown v. Board of 
Education.13 
But Jones, and its recognition of the relationship between private and 
public coercion, deserves much more respect and attention.  The history of 
Reconstruction legislation, especially the 1866 Act, reveals that Jones was 
in fact faithful to the remedial goals of the Reconstruction Congress.  The 
Thirty-ninth Congress had before it extensive reports of collusive private 
behavior among whites designed to restrict the freedman’s ability to acquire 
economic and social liberty.14  The legislature passed the 1866 Act despite 
assurances from laissez-faire supporters, including President Andrew 
Johnson, that the marketplace would correct itself without intervention.  
Indeed, Congress’s aggressive action during Reconstruction gave 
intellectual and political legitimacy to later, and more successful, efforts at 
market regulation—specifically, antitrust legislation of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.  As such, Jones confirms the historical roots 
of an otherwise modern insight:  that “civil rights law [is] continuous with 
and complementary to other laws of advantage-taking—including the law 
of antitrust.”15 
Moreover, development of Thirteenth Amendment doctrine, beginning 
with Jones, is necessary to equip policy makers with tools appropriate to 
address the realities of inequality in the current age.  Systemic, as opposed 
to discrete, instances of discrimination and inequality are the challenge of 
the twenty-first century.  These problems resist the litigation and 
demonstration approaches of the last century and call for the development 
of a new set of doctrines and tools.  Simultaneously, Thirteenth Amendment 
development is necessary to repair fissures in the foundation of existing 
civil rights doctrine, in the form of a renewed emphasis on state sovereignty 
and federalism,16 associational rights,17 and (potentially) private property 
 
state action formulae.  Jones was the first case to directly state that it was private action 
alone that could have these nefarious effects. 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 181–84. 
 12. See infra Part III.B. 
 13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See Ayres, supra note 8, at 684. 
 16. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365, 374 (2001) 
(holding that the Americans with Disabilities Act as it applies to private suits for money 
damages against states is unconstitutional in part because it attempts to redefine the level of 
protection the Fourteenth Amendment affords to disabled persons); Kimel v. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62, 83–84 (2000) (holding that Congress cannot pass the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act as it applies to private suits for money damages against states under its 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 power); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 
(1997) (holding that Congress does not have authority to pass the Religious Freedom 
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rights, over equality.18  These fissures threaten to weaken those gains in 
civil rights that already have been made. 
This Article, therefore, has three aims.  First, it is an examination of the 
social and legislative history of Reconstruction legislation, in particular the 
1866 Act, with special attention to Congress’s effort to act as a market 
regulator.19  Second, it is a biographical monograph of an important, but 
often forgotten, case in American legal history.  Unlike Brown, the human 
drama behind Jones largely has been neglected.  This Article peers behind 
the caption, telling the story of the judges, the litigants, their counsel, and 
their lives in St. Louis after the decision.  Third, it is an effort to assist in 
doctrinal development.  The market-corrective approach of Congress20—
recognized and affirmed by Jones—may help resolve unanswered questions 
about the purpose, scope, and enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part I traces the personal and 
procedural history of Jones.  In the process, it explains how Jones marked a 
stunning departure from the blind alley of “state action” jurisprudence 
 
Restoration Act under its Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 power); cf. United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619–20 (2000) (holding that Congress lacks the authority under 
both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to pass the Violence Against 
Women Act). But see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735–37 (2003) 
(holding that Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 power permits money damages 
against states under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993). 
 17. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660 (2000) (striking down application 
of New Jersey’s antidiscrimination legislation as it applies to the Boy Scouts because it 
interferes with freedom of association); cf. George Rutherglen, The Improbable History of 
Section 1981:  Clio Still Bemused and Confused, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 342 (noting that 
“the very breadth of section 1981 assures that, at some point, it will come into collision with 
the right to freedom of association”).  For arguments that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 
questions the legitimacy of antidiscrimination legislation, see David E. Bernstein, 
Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV. 83, 139 (2001), and 
Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation:  The Case of the Boy Scouts, 
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (2000).  For a contrary view, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-
Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002). 
 18. Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005) (holding that a city 
may condemn private property through eminent domain and transfer the property to private 
developers to further an urban redevelopment program).  Citing the public outcry over Kelo 
v. City of New London, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson recognize that the core philosophy 
of Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)—“that governments may not 
destroy vested property rights of A’s and give them to B—retains strong support in American 
culture.” Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49, 75–76 (2007). 
 19. The author is acutely aware that efforts to determine legislative intent with finality 
can be a mug’s game.  As Robert Kaczorowski has admonished, “[t]he attempt to determine 
legislative intent is . . . a dubious project at best.” Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary 
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 
865 (1986).  The most we can hope for are conclusions with “relative degrees of certainty.” 
Id. at 866.  
 20. The Court has said that the 1866 Act “is clearly corrective in its character, intended 
to counteract and furnish redress against state laws and proceedings, and customs having the 
force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified.” The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3, 16 (1883).  However, as this Article argues, members of the Reconstruction Congress had 
more than simply law-like custom on their minds. 
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under the Fourteenth Amendment and instead adopted what may be termed 
a functional market-corrective approach to private discrimination under the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  Part II explores how congressional debates over 
the 1866 Act and contemporaneous legislation reveal an unmistakable—and 
ultimately confounding—attempt to address discriminatory collective 
actions of private individuals.  This part further demonstrates how these 
Reconstruction debates gave unacknowledged intellectual credence to the 
antitrust movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
Part III closes the story of the Joneses, detailing how their lives changed, 
how St. Louis did not change, and the legacy of Jones as a feature of 
constitutional jurisprudence.  Of particular concern will be how Jones’s 
interpretation of Reconstruction legislation addresses some doctrinal 
features of the Thirteenth Amendment:  specifically, Congress’s ability to 
craft prophylactic legislation in the absence of Supreme Court guidance, 
Congress’s ability to proscribe discriminatory acts that cause disparate 
impact rather than reflect disparate treatment, and the relative roles of 
Congress and the courts in deciding when and how extensively to protect 
persons from the relics of slavery. 
I.  JONES V. ALFRED H. MAYER CO. 
A.  The District Court 
Jones, like so many other civil rights cases, began with a gratuitous racial 
slight.  In June 1965, Joseph Lee Jones, an African American, and his white 
wife, Barbara Jo, drove to the Paddock Woods subdivision north of St. 
Louis, in St. Louis County,21 to see a model home that had been advertised 
in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.22  St. Louis was an old, crowded, and 
heavily segregated city.23  Paddock Woods was a brand new planned 
community of neat little homes next to a golf course. 
The development was owned and operated by the Alfred H. Mayer 
Company.  The Alfred H. Mayer Company was a young, prolific, and 
fabulously successful real estate development corporation.  In just three 
years, its founder Alfred Hugh Mayer had built his fledgling enterprise into 
the largest home builder in St. Louis.24  Mayer was only thirty-six years 
 
 21.  The City of St. Louis and St. Louis County are different municipal entities.  Unlike 
most cities, St. Louis is not contained within any county. See St. Louis City Government, 
http://stlouis.missouri.org/about/government.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).  
 22. See Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer:  Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SUP. 
CT. REV. 89, 90–91. 
 23. Gerhard Casper notes that the state of de facto segregation in St. Louis at the time 
was approximately 90.5%, meaning that 90.5% of nonwhites who lived in St. Louis in 1960 
would have to move from nonwhite areas to white areas in order to completely integrate the 
city. Id. at 90 n.5 (citing KARL E. TAEUBER & ALMA F. TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES:  
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE 28–31 (1965)). 
 24. See 3 DAVID D. MARCH, THE HISTORY OF MISSOURI:  FAMILY AND PERSONAL 
HISTORY 118 (1967). 
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old,25 but he was born into the business.  The ex-Marine was the product of 
two generations of St. Louis real estate builders and had already worked for 
ten years in the trade when he founded his own company.26  Mayer had 
made his fortune by focusing on high volume, low overhead, and an 
insatiable demand for suburban homes priced in the middle market.27  
Paddock Woods was Mayer’s newest venture:  an arc of homes on an 
undeveloped stretch of land near the Paddock Country Club, where Mayer 
was a member and former president.28 
Joseph Lee Jones was a Mississippi transplant in his midthirties.29  
Barbara Jo and he had met while they both worked for the Veterans 
Administration.30  A contemporary photograph of the couple shows a dark, 
mustachioed man with close-cropped hair and a large round head; a light-
skinned woman sits beside him, her mouth caught slightly agape in 
midsentence; her dark, prominent eyebrows arch beneath a bouffant of red 
tussled hair.31  In 1965, the Joneses had been married for six years (they 
had married in Illinois, because black-white marriages were still illegal in 
Missouri in 1959),32 and for the last two and a half years, they had been 
saving for a larger home, on a larger lot, closer to their offices.33  After 
inspecting a “Hyde-Park Model Home,” the Joneses approached the real 
estate agent with an offer.34  The real estate agent informed the couple that 
it was Mayer’s “‘general policy not to sell houses and lots to Negroes’” and 
“in effect ‘refused to consider [the Joneses’] application . . . for the sale of a 
 
 25. A contemporary photograph of Alfred H. Mayer shows a slightly balding man with a 
high forehead, bright eyes, and thick, strong features. See id. at 116–17 (photo appears on 
unnumbered page between pages 116 and 117). 
 26. Id. at 118. 
 27. Id.  According to David March, Mayer priced his homes in the $15,000 to $30,000 
bracket.  This corresponds to the median price of houses in the Midwest region around that 
time. See U.S. Housing Market Conditions,  Historical Data, Table 8A:  New and Single 
Family Home Prices:  1963–Present, http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/ushmc/ 
fall97/histdat2.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2008). 
 28. See MARCH, supra note 24, at 118. 
 29. See Timothy Bleck, Pair “Just Wanted a House”; Issue Has Gone to High Court, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 29, 1967, at 6A. 
 30. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115, 118 (E.D. Mo. 1966); Bleck, 
supra note 29. 
 31. See Editorial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 10, 1967, at 1B. 
 32. See Bleck, supra note 29.  Missouri was one of the states that still outlawed 
interracial marriages between blacks and whites, even after the Court struck down all 
antimiscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Compare Loving, 388 U.S. 
1, with MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.020 (West 1959) (amended by 1969 Mo. Laws 545 to strike 
down antimiscegenation language). 
 33. See Jones, 255 F. Supp. at 118; see also Bleck, supra note 29. 
 34. Jones, 255 F. Supp. at 118; see also Casper, supra note 22, at 91. 
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house and lot.’”35  Mayer apparently feared that white purchasers would 
boycott his business if he sold lots to blacks.36 
On September 2, 1965, the Joneses filed suit in the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri.  They alleged violations of Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 196437 as well as of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution.38  In addition, the Joneses alleged 
violation of the 1866 Act, which had been recodified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–
1982.  Section 1982, which would take primacy in the litigation, states 
simply that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”39 
The Joneses named as defendants the Alfred H. Mayer Company, the 
Alfred Realty Company, the Paddock Country Club, Inc., and Alfred H. 
Mayer as an individual and officer of the various corporations.  They sought 
a temporary injunction to keep Mayer from selling the lot they wished to 
purchase, a permanent injunction against discrimination in the future, and 
actual and punitive damages.40  Judge John Keating Regan, a fifty-five-
year-old Kennedy appointee and four-year veteran of the federal bench, 
presided over the case.41  Mayer moved to dismiss, and on May 18, 1966, 
Judge Regan obliged.42 
From the text of the opinion, it is clear that the Joneses had struggled to 
shoehorn their case into the existing Fourteenth Amendment/state-action 
strategy of civil rights litigation.  Ever since the Civil Rights Cases,43 civil 
 
 35. Jones, 255 F. Supp. at 118.  The Joneses later told the newspaper that they had been 
followed through the model homes, “[l]ike [they] were going to take something.” Bleck, 
supra note 29 (internal quotation marks omitted).  When the Joneses finally asked a 
salesman about a possible purchase, he answered, “We aren’t selling houses to Negroes until 
the market opens up.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36. See Casper, supra note 22, at 91. 
 37.  42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000). 
 38. Jones, 255 F. Supp. at 118.  The Joneses also claimed violation of both Article VI of 
the Constitution and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 1982. 
 40. See Jones, 255 F. Supp. at 119. 
 41. See Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid= 
1986 (last visited Nov. 19, 2008). 
 42. The docket reveals that Mayer moved to dismiss the initial complaint on October 18, 
1965.  On November 5, the Joneses filed an amended complaint by leave of court, and 
Mayer moved to dismiss that amended complaint on December 6. 
 43. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (1875 Act).  The 1875 Act required “full 
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, 
public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement” 
regardless of color, and provided for civil and criminal penalties for its violation. Act of 
March 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335, 336, invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in an 8-1 opinion, held that the 1875 Act could not be 
supported by Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, as the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied only to state action. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23–25.  Neither 
did the Act fall within Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power, as to hold that 
private discrimination in theaters and other places of public accommodation was among the 
“badges [or] incidents” of slavery would “[run] the slavery argument into the ground.” Id. at 
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rights litigants well understood that the Fourteenth Amendment, and any 
legislation passed to enforce it, addressed itself solely to state actors.  
Private discrimination, by contrast, was beyond the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s reach, and beyond the scope of congressional enforcement 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.44  Nevertheless, for 
nearly twenty years, through ingenious but increasingly strained and 
fractured reasoning, the Supreme Court had extended the state action 
doctrine further and further into what was traditionally regarded as purely 
private behavior. 
In Marsh v. Alabama,45 a Jehovah’s Witness named Grace Marsh was 
convicted of soliciting religious literature on a sidewalk in a company town 
owned and operated by the Gulf Shipbuilding Company.46  The Court held 
that Marsh’s conviction violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Constitution.47  A private corporation, like Gulf Shipbuilding, could not 
avoid application of state action principles when it had effectively assumed 
all the features and functions of a municipal corporation.48 
Shelley v. Kraemer,49 decided two years later, concerned white 
landowners’ attempt to enforce racially restrictive covenants against black 
purchasers in state court.50  Although J.D. Shelley’s trial counsel argued 
that the covenants violated the Thirteenth Amendment as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment,51 the Court only granted certiorari on the 
Fourteenth Amendment issue.  The Court unanimously held that—although 
the private covenants themselves were legal—judicial enforcement of them 
manifests state action prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.52 
 
20, 24.  The Civil Rights Cases have never been overturned, and their “state action” 
requirement has been reaffirmed as recently as 2000. See United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000). 
 44. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17–18.  In 1965, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 
U.S. 294 (1964), and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), two 
cases upholding the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964 
Act), were not even a year old.  Both of these cases had held that the Commerce Clause—not 
the Fourteenth Amendment—authorized Congress to enact the 1964 Act.  Further, neither of 
these cases, nor the 1964 Act, addressed the sale of real estate. 
 45. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 46. Id. at 502. 
 47.  Id. at 507–09. 
 48. Id. at 507. 
 49. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 50. Id. at 6. 
 51. J.D. Shelley’s counsel, George Vaughn, was criticized by Thurgood Marshall, 
among others, for pursuing a Thirteenth Amendment strategy. See William B. Rubenstein, 
Divided We Litigate:  Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil 
Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1627, 1653 (1997).  Recent scholarship, however, 
has rehabilitated Vaughn’s maligned approach. See Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer 
Incorrectly Decided?  Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451 (2007) (arguing that Shelley 
is better understood as a Thirteenth Amendment rather than Fourteenth Amendment case). 
 52. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23.  Justices Stanley Forman Reed, Robert Jackson, and Wiley 
Rutledge took no part in Shelley v. Kraemer.  They offered no reason, although some have 
assumed that it was because they owned property touched by racially restrictive covenants. 
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In Terry v. Adams,53 a private organization in Texas called the 
“Jaybirds,” which excluded African Americans from membership, held a 
nominating primary—the results of which the Texas Democratic Party 
almost invariably followed.54  The Court found that the Jaybirds’ 
protestation that they were a “private group[]” did not insulate them from 
liability as a “state actor” under the Fifteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.55  Justice Sherman Minton shared the majority’s “dislike” of 
the Jaybirds’ scheme, but dissented because of his concern that the Court 
had extended state action too far.56 
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,57  a coffee shop located in an 
off-street parking garage in Wilmington, Delaware refused to serve an 
African American.58  The city financed the parking garage, leased the space 
to the coffee shop, and maintained the entire structure out of public 
revenue.59  The Court held that the “the benefits mutually conferred” by the 
arrangement, along with “the obvious fact that the restaurant is operated as 
an integral part of a public building,” brought the shop under the state 
action blanket.60  Justice John Marshall Harlan II, joined by Justice Charles 
Evans Whittaker, dissented.  The majority’s opinion left them “completely 
at sea [as to] just what it is . . . that satisfies the requirement of ‘state 
action.’”61 
Finally, in the “Sit-In Cases” of the early to mid-1960s, the Court 
considered the Fourteenth Amendment arguments of several lunch counter 
demonstrators who faced prosecution for trespassing on the private property 
of the lunch counter owners.62  The demonstrators maintained that their 
 
See Leland B. Ware, Invisible Walls:  An Examination of the Legal Strategy of the 
Restrictive Covenant Cases, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 737, 761 (1989). 
 53. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).  Terry v. Adams and such cases as Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 
536 (1927), and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), typically are referred to as the 
“white primary” cases. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings:  A 
Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
55 (2001). 
 54. Terry, 345 U.S. at 462–65. 
 55. Id. at 466–70. 
 56. Id. at 494 (Minton, J., dissenting). 
 57. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
 58. Id. at 716. 
 59. Id. at 723–26. 
 60. Id. at 724. 
 61. Id. at 728 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 62. See Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 307 (1964); Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 
(1964); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); 
Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Avent v. 
North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Gober v. Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963); Wright v. 
Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. 
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247 (1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).  For a 
general account of these cases, see Brad Ervin, Note, Result or Reason:  The Supreme Court 
and the Sit-In Cases, 93 VA. L. REV. 181 (2007).  Brad Ervin notes that accounts of the 
Justices’ conference reveal a Court majority prepared to extend state action doctrine 
incredibly far to avoid upholding the convictions. See id. at 185 (citing Michael Klarman, An 
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 272–73 (1991)). 
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prosecution for ostensibly neutral trespass and other regulations in service 
of private racial discrimination were types of discriminatory state action 
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.  In a series of frayed decisions, 
the Court accepted the demonstrators’ arguments in some cases and rejected 
them in others.63  Justice Harlan expressed fear that the Court was fast 
abandoning any “recognition that there are areas of private rights upon 
which federal power should not lay a heavy hand and which should 
properly be left to the more precise instruments of local authority.”64 
By the late 1960s, when the district court heard Jones, the Court’s state 
action jurisprudence had become “a conceptual disaster area.”65  And it was 
into this doctrinal thicket that the Joneses plunged in 1965. 
In hindsight, the time was ripe for a new model of civil rights litigation, 
focused on the Thirteenth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Nevertheless, the Joneses were cautious.  They designed their principal 
strategy to track the state action litigation models of the previous decades—
especially Marsh.  “A substantial portion of the complaint is devoted to 
allegations . . . relating to the future development of Paddock Woods,”66 the 
court began.  The details included Mayer’s plans to build a community of 
100 projected homes, for approximately 1000 people, and to build bath and 
tennis club facilities nearby.67  Further, the Joneses claimed discrimination 
by real estate developers, rather than by individual homeowners.  “Plaintiffs 
do not contend that every person who offers a home for sale has no right to 
refuse to sell his property on racially discriminatory grounds,”68 Judge 
Regan wrote.  Instead, “[t]he thrust of their complaint is that a developer of 
a private subdivision is in a different category, apparently because his 
activities are business in nature.”69  In this sense, the Joneses’ litigation 
strategy was conservative and, perhaps, incremental.  They did not want to 
argue that every instance of residential racial discrimination was forbidden.  
Instead, they wanted to argue that the size and complexity of the Paddock 
Woods development enabled Mayer, alone or through the regulatory actions 
of the county, to exercise discriminatory power akin to that of a 
government. 
The court didn’t buy the hedge.  It was immaterial whether the property 
belonged to a single homeowner or to a large real estate developer.  The 
“legal right to purchase property does not . . . carry with it a corresponding 
obligation on the part of the owner to enter into a contract of sale against his 
 
 63. See generally Ervin, supra note 62. 
 64. Peterson, 373 U.S. at 250 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 65. Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword:  “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s 
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); see also ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. 
HARBISON & HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:  ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
593–94 (7th ed. 1991) [hereinafter AMERICAN CONSTITUTION] (tracking the development of 
the state action concept from its inception to the late 1990s).  
 66. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115, 118 (E.D. Mo. 1966). 
 67. Id. at 118–19. 
 68. Id. at 119. 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
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will.”70  More fundamentally, § 1982 did not reach purely private 
discrimination.  Relying on Hurd v. Hodge,71 the court pronounced that 
“[i]t is now well settled that these civil rights statutes [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 
1982, and 1983] are directed toward governmental action.”72 
Hurd, the case referenced by Judge Regan, was a companion to the 
Court’s landmark 1948 Shelley decision.  Hurd mirrored Shelley, except 
that in Hurd, the racially restrictive covenant bound owners in the District 
of Columbia, and the presiding judge was a federal, not state, officer.73  
Counsel for James Hurd74 urged the Court to reverse the lower court on the 
grounds that enforcement of the covenant violated the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.75  The Supreme Court refused to pass on the 
constitutional question, however.  Instead, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, 
writing for the Court, held that the 1866 Act, rather than the Fifth 
Amendment, forbade federal courts from enforcing racially restrictive 
covenants.76  To reinforce the statutory argument, the Hurd Court explained 
how the 1866 Act restricted the federal judiciary in the same way the 
Fourteenth Amendment restricted the state judiciary.77  But Chief Justice 
Vinson overtorqued the analogy, emphasizing that the 1866 Act derives its 
power from the Fourteenth Amendment78 and wholly ignoring the 
Thirteenth Amendment source of the statute.79  Most portentous of all, 
Chief Justice Vinson stated in dicta that “the statute does not invalidate 
private restrictive agreements so long as the purposes of those agreements 
are achieved by the parties through voluntary adherence to the terms.”80 
Although Judge Regan recognized that the state action concept had 
swelled to encompass far more conduct than it had in the late nineteenth 
century, still he insisted the 1866 Act required some state involvement, 
direct or indirect.81  Judge Regan then spurned each of the plaintiffs’ 
attempts to cram Mayer’s discrimination into the state action model.  In 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). 
 72. Jones, 255 F. Supp. at 119. 
 73. See Hurd, 334 U.S. at 26. 
 74. Counsel included the formidable Charles Hamilton Houston. See id. at 25. 
 75. Id. at 28–29.  Obviously, James Hurd had to rely on the Fifth Amendment, rather 
than the Fourteenth, as the latter amendment then applied to the states, not to the federal 
government.  The Court eventually would apply the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection guarantees back through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, but not until 
the 1954 case of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 76. Hurd, 334 U.S. at 33–34. 
 77. Id. at 32. 
 78. Id. (“It is clear that in many significant respects the statute and the Amendment were 
expressions of the same general congressional policy.”); id. at 33 (“The close relationship 
between § 1 of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment was given specific 
recognition by this Court in Buchanan v. Warley.” (citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 
79 (1917))). 
 79. See generally Rosen, supra note 51. 
 80. Hurd, 334 U.S. at 31.  Perhaps the Chief Justice hoped that, absent government 
enforcement, “defections” from purely voluntary discriminatory agreements would lead to 
their extinction. 
 81. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 255 F. Supp. 115, 129 (E.D. Mo. 1966). 
MILLER AFTER BP 12/7/2009  1:46:04 PM 
2008] HISTORY OF JONES v. ALFRED H. MAYER CO. 1011 
Regan’s opinion, Mayer’s refusal to sell to the Joneses was not like those 
cases in which intransigent state authorities leased or conveyed property to 
private parties to avoid state action liability.82  Nor was Mayer’s 
discrimination like the white primary cases.83  Nor did the scope of the 
development mean that Paddock Woods had effectively become a 
municipality.84  Nor did Mayer seek state assistance to forcibly eject the 
Joneses from the property, as did private owners in the lunch counter sit-in 
cases.85 
Quoting Justice Hugo L. Black’s dissent in one contemporary sit-in case, 
Bell v. Maryland,86 the district court concluded that the 1866 Act protected 
freedmen against state restrictions on the acquisition or disposition of 
property, including by judicial enforcement, but “when the property owner 
chooses not to sell to a particular person or not to admit that person, then     
. . . he is entitled to rely on the guarantee of due process of law . . . to 
protect his free use and enjoyment of property.”87  That free use of property 
remained inviolate, unless superseded by “valid legislation, passed pursuant 
to some constitutional grant of power.”88  Judge Regan counseled that, “[i]f 
the defendants’ refusal to sell their privately owned property to plaintiffs is 
violative of any right of plaintiffs, their remedy is not in this court.”89 
B.  The Eighth Circuit 
The Joneses appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.90  Then-Judge 
Harry Blackmun, sitting with Judges Pat Mehaffy and Donald P. Lay, 
formed the panel.  Judge Blackmun’s opinion began with bracing clarity:  
“This case comes close to raising nakedly the question whether, in the 
absence of federal and state open housing legislation, an owner of a home, 
which is on the market for sale, may refuse to sell that home to a willing 
purchaser merely because that purchaser is a Negro.”91  Judge Blackmun 
recognized that the Joneses’ argument went far beyond restraining the 
activity of real estate agents and sophisticated land developers; it asked for 
nothing less than to modify heretofore sacrosanct notions of individual 
property rights. 
The court summarized the history of the 1866 Act, the predecessor to the 
modern § 1982, and its passage under the Thirteenth Amendment.92  It 
noted that after the states had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress 
re-enacted the 1866 Act, with some modification, as the Enforcement Act 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 124. 
 84. Id. at 129. 
 85. Id. at 124–25. 
 86. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
 87. Id. at 331 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 88. Jones, 255 F. Supp. at 126 (citing Bell, 378 U.S. at 331 (Black, J., dissenting)). 
 89. Id. at 130. 
 90.  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967). 
 91. Id. at 34. 
 92. Id. at 37. 
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of 1870.  After this, Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (the 
precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  The court 
summarized, 
 From this chronology one sees . . . that the 1866 Act followed 
immediately upon the Thirteenth Amendment; that it became law before 
the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress; that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was directed to situations not reached by the 
Thirteenth [Amendment] or by the 1866 Act . . . [and] that, seemingly, the 
1870 and 1871 Acts were an implementation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . .93 
Judge Blackmun then analyzed this chronology in light of Supreme Court 
precedent.  “There are definite indications in Supreme Court opinions that 
the 1866 Act and § 1982 are subject to the limitations of the [Fourteenth] 
Amendment’s first section and are not now to be regarded as direct 
legislation implementing . . . the Thirteenth Amendment.”94  “Of particular 
significance,” the court continued, was Chief Justice Vinson’s “rather 
positive language” in Hurd stating that the 1866 Act was a creature of the 
Fourteenth, rather than the Thirteenth, Amendment.95 
The court rejected the Joneses’ argument that the Fourteenth or the 
Thirteenth Amendment each independently prohibited Mayer’s actions.  
The Fourteenth Amendment did not apply, because there was no indication 
that Mayer had ever received government money to finance, develop, or 
maintain the project.  And, while acknowledging the possibility that “[a] 
right to purchase will be of limited scope if it can be denied or destroyed by 
those who place property on the market,”96—especially where the seller is a 
“large real estate developer”—the court rejected this functionalist view.97  
Mayer had not denied the Joneses’ right to own and acquire property, but 
merely had denied the Joneses’ opportunity to own and acquire a particular 
piece of property.98 
The court also rejected the conceptual framework of Marsh99 and its ilk, 
in which the municipal operations of a private company become so 
complete, or so enmeshed in political activity, that the private actor 
becomes a de facto state actor.100  The difficulty with this argument, 
according to the court, was “that . . . it relies on state inaction, rather than 
state action.”101  The court would be hard pressed to determine where 
government functions ended and private functions began102 and, relatedly, 
when or whether a government’s failure to prevent private racial 
 
 93. Id. at 38. 
 94. Id. at 39. 
 95. Id. at 39–40. 
 96. Id. at 43. 
 97. Id. at 44. 
 98. See id. at 43–44. 
 99. See supra notes 45–48. 
 100. Jones, 379 F.2d at 44. 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
 102. See id. 
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discrimination can be a species of state action.103  So, while the opinion 
recognized that the Court’s recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence 
“broadly viewed the concept of state action,”104 it concluded that state 
action was not so broad as to encompass the facts in Jones, where there was 
no colorable state action whatsoever. 
The court then considered the question of whether the private 
discrimination in Jones ran afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment itself.  The 
court rejected this argument with some reluctance.  The opinion explained 
that racial discrimination in private real estate contracts theoretically could 
constitute a “badge of slavery” prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.105  
In fact, one district court had construed the 1866 Act in such a fashion.106  
But that lone court had done so in the teeth of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in the Civil Rights Cases and in conflict with the Court’s later opinion in 
Hurd.  Therefore, the court stated, despite any “personal inclination any of 
us might have,” it was not for the judges of the circuit, as an inferior 
tribunal, “to take the lead in expanding constitutional precepts when we are 
faced with a limiting Supreme Court decision which . . . remains good 
law.”107 
The court simply refused to pioneer uncharted constitutional territory 
without guidance from the Supreme Court or Congress.108  It therefore 
affirmed, but only after it supplied the High Court with a road map to 
reverse: 
 It would not be too surprising if the Supreme Court one day were to 
hold that a court errs when it dismisses a complaint of this kind.  It could 
do so by asserting that § 1982 was, because of its derivation from the 
Thirteenth Amendment, free of the shackles of state action despite what 
has been said in [Hurd v. Hodge].  It could do so by asserting that, even 
though § 1982, because of its reenactment, was subject to Fourteenth 
Amendment limitations, we nevertheless have, on the accepted facts here, 
enough to constitute state action in the light of the expanding concept of 
that term.  And it could do so on the ground . . . that state action is no 
longer a factor of limitation and that Congress has acted through § 1982 to 
reach private discrimination in housing.109 
 
 103. Id. (citing Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 834 (Cal. 1966), aff’d, 387 U.S. 369 
(1967) (finding that a state constitutional amendment designed to repeal a California fair 
housing law was discriminatory “state action” and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution)). 
 104. Id. at 40. 
 105. Id. at 43. 
 106. Id. (citing United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322 (E.D. Ark. 1903)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 45 (“The matter . . . is one of policy, to be implemented in the customary 
manner by appropriate statutes directed to the need.  If we are wrong in this conclusion, the 
Supreme Court will tell us so . . . and limit those . . . prior decisions . . . which we feel are 
restrictive upon us.”). 
 109. Id. at 44–45. 
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Blackmun was not idly musing; Blackmun wanted to be reversed.  To him, 
desegregated housing was necessary to eliminate the black ghetto.110  He 
admitted to colleagues that, although he felt bound by Supreme Court 
precedent, he had deliberately “spell[ed] out precisely how the opposite 
decision could be reached” and had “served the issues up on a tray, 
figuratively, for the Supreme Court to take.”111 
C.  The Supreme Court 
1.  The Argument 
The Supreme Court took the offer.  It granted certiorari on December 4, 
1967.112  The next day, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch ran an editorial 
sympathetic to the Joneses, and hostile to local leaders’ lack of mettle.113  
The editor castigated those who hoped the “the Federal Government” would 
“rescue them from unpleasant decisions.”114  Noting the novelty of the 
Joneses’ arguments, the Post-Dispatch predicted that, should the Supreme 
Court reverse, “it would strike a blow for fair housing similar to its massive 
demand for public school desegregation 13 years ago.”115  The paper 
assailed “[c]ivic leadership [who] ignore basic rights for fear they might not 
meet a popularity test, or sit by in hopes that the Supreme Court, or 
Congress, or somebody else may relieve them of responsibility.”116  The 
editor concluded by calling “[t]he state, St. Louis [C]ounty, and every 
county municipality” to action.117 
The Jones oral argument pitted one generation of St. Louis Jewish-
American jurist against the other.  Thirty-three-year-old Harvard Law 
graduate Samuel H. Liberman II represented the Joneses.  Liberman was the 
“reserved, self-effacing” son of a former St. Louis city official, and a newly 
minted partner of Kramer, Chused and Kramer.118  Sixty-seven-year-old 
 
 110. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN:  HARRY BLACKMUN’S 
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 30 (2005). 
 111. Id. (quoting statements of Justice Harry Blackmun to M.C. Matthes and Gerald W. 
Heaney) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112. On the Court at that time were Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Associate Justices 
Hugo L. Black, William O. Douglas, John Marshall Harlan II, William J. Brennan, Potter 
Stewart, Byron R. White, Abe Fortas, and Thurgood Marshall.  Among those parties urging 
review were the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Committee Against 
Discrimination in Housing. James C. Millstone, Housing Bias Case Accepted by High Court, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 4, 1967, at 1A. 
 113. Editorial, Waiting for Leadership, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 1967, at 2B. 
 114. Id.  To emphasize the point, the editorial included a cartoon depicting craven local 
officials hiding behind the skirts of a Supreme Court Justice’s robe. See id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. James W. Singer, Lawyers in Landmark Suit, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 
1968, at 2G.  The elder Samuel H. Liberman himself had argued a Supreme Court case 
dealing with municipal income tax while working for the city. See Walters v. City of St. 
Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954). 
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Israel Treiman represented Mayer.  Treiman was a Russian-Jewish 
immigrant from Odessa.119  After immigrating to America as a child, 
Treiman had gone on to a prestigious academic career as a Rhodes Scholar 
and a Washington University Law graduate and instructor.120  His practice 
as a lawyer had already spanned over twenty years by the time he took on 
Jones.  A contemporary photograph of Treiman shows a dignified elder 
statesman with a lined, pensive face—the severe square handkerchief in his 
breast pocket and his French cuffs betraying just a touch of Oxbridge 
pomp.121  Although he represented Alfred Mayer, in fact Treiman had 
helped to engineer the opening of an exclusive St. Louis club to African 
Americans in 1964.122  “I find it ironic,” he admitted prior to argument, 
“that I seem to favor segregation since I have supported liberal causes all 
my life.”123 
The briefs set the battle along predictable lines.  Either the 1866 Act 
contemplated private discrimination, or it was restricted to state action.  If 
the former, the Joneses won; if the latter, the Joneses would have to 
persuade the Justices that Mayer’s actions fit under the Fourteenth 
Amendment state action umbrella.  To persuade the Justices that the 1866 
Act touched purely private discrimination, the Joneses asserted that both the 
Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Amendments invalidated the “Black Codes” 
unaided by congressional legislation.124  Therefore, Congress intended the 
1866 Act to create “certain positive rights for Negro citizens, which . . . it 
considered to be the fundamental rights of citizenship.”125  Congress 
intentionally placed private persons within the scope of the Act, as “the 
right to enforce a contract in court would be valueless, if no one would 
contract with a Negro.”126 
Later in their brief, the Joneses made their functional argument more 
express: 
 Congress did not intend to create an illusory right to purchase, 
dependent upon the will of the sellers in the market to sell.  If such is the 
case, the Joneses have no real right to live anywhere in St. Louis County, 
or for that matter in the State of Missouri, or any of the States of the 
 
 119.  2 WALTER EHRLICH, ZION IN THE VALLEY:  THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ST. LOUIS:  
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 90 (2002). 
 120. Singer, supra note 118. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  In fact, Treiman’s representation of Mayer 
was doubly ironic.  Treiman had fled his native Russia as a child to escape a pogrom and had 
spent his boyhood “prepared [to] fight” with an Irish gang whenever he left the environs of 
St. Louis’s Jewish Ghetto. See EHRLICH, supra note 119, at 90 (quoting Interview with Israel 
Treiman (Sept. 8, 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 124. See Brief of Petitioners at 13, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) 
(No. 645), reprinted in 67 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES:  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57, 69 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper 
eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 14, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 70.  
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United States.  If the sellers are allowed to exclude Negroes from one 
area, they are equally allowed to exclude Negroes from all areas.  
Certainly, Congress did not mean to allow the owners and sellers of real 
estate to create the two “separate but equal” real estate markets . . . .127 
The U.S. Department of Justice, briefing the case as amicus on behalf of 
reversal, echoed these sentiments, but with even more of a legal realist 
flavor: 
 Undoubtedly, a uniform rule of exclusion imposed by outside 
compulsion is often more effective in maintaining residential segregation.  
But, however rare the occurrence, the same result is equally offensive 
when achieved by the voluntary action of property owners.  In 1866 there 
was probably no distinction to be drawn between the two situations 
because the white landowners—alone eligible to vote and holding all 
political power—simply passed a law excluding Negroes from the 
area.128 
The Department emphasized that while the enfranchisement of African 
Americans had changed this situation somewhat, still the Act “should not 
be read to condone the identical fencing out accomplished by other 
means.”129 
Mayer’s brief zeroed on the limited scope of the 1866 Act and urged 
judicial restraint.  His argument was largely statutory, not constitutional.  
Mayer did not challenge Congress’s authority to pass the Act under either 
the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment.130  Instead, he argued that, 
according to the plain text and legislative history of the Act, the only 
“right” the 1866 Act guaranteed to African Americans was the legal 
capacity to buy property; it did not create a legal obligation for whites to 
sell to African Americans.131  Further, according to Mayer, the Act, if 
applied to private sales of real estate, equally would apply to all varieties of 
personal property, as the text of the Act admitted no distinction between the 
two types of property.  This application would open a “Pandora’s box” of 
litigation against private parties based on a person’s refusal to sell food, 
clothes, furniture, even family heirlooms.132  Finally, Mayer counseled 
judicial restraint.  To craft a remedy, according to Mayer, the Court would 
have to take on “difficult and non-judicial” functions better left to 
legislatures.133 
 
 127. Id. at 15, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 71.  
 128. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 60, Jones, 392 U.S. 409 (No. 645), 
reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 200, 259. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Brief for the Respondents at 2, Jones, 392 U.S. 409 (No. 645), reprinted in 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 118, 119. 
 131. Id. at 3, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 120. 
 132. Id. at 37, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 154. 
 133. Id. at 4, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 121.  To support his 
judicial modesty argument, Mayer quoted Abraham Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address: 
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital 
questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the 
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The Court heard arguments during the first two days of April 1968.  The 
Court expressed moderate skepticism that the Act distinguished between 
large developers, like Mayer, and individual sellers: 
THE COURT:  Does [the Act] apply to an individual house-owner? 
MR. LIBERMAN:  Your Honor, that question is not before the Court in 
this case. 
THE COURT:  I know that; but, in your view of the statute? 
MR. LIBERMAN:  In my view of the statute, it would apply to an 
individual house-owner, as well.134 
Liberman circled back again and again to the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Marsh, but these arguments eventually were disregarded.  In one sequence 
of interrogation, it became apparent that, if the Court abandoned its reliance 
on the Fourteenth Amendment and its increasingly tortured state action 
applications, it would have to consider of its own accord whether Congress 
possessed the constitutional authority to pass the 1866 Act: 
THE COURT:  But if this were valid legislation, under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, it escapes me why we have to worry about the Fourteenth 
Amendment and any limitations contained in it. 
MR. LIBERMAN:  It’s our opinion that we don’t have to, but that we’re 
really engaged in a question of statutory interpretation. 
THE COURT:  And the power of Congress under the Thirteenth 
Amendment to enact this legislation? 
MR. LIBERMAN:  Yes.135  
2.  The Decision 
The Court waited until the end of the Term to issue a decision.  Seven to 
two, it reversed.  Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the majority, held that 
“§ 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale 
or rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise 
of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.”136 
 
Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in 
personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that 
extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent 
tribunal. 
Id. at 5–6, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 122–23 (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (May 4, 1861)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 134. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jones, 392 U.S. 409 (No. 645), as reprinted in 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 621, 623. 
 135. Id. at 626. 
 136. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413. 
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Justice Stewart immediately qualified that bold pronouncement,137 
delineating what the case did not involve:  it did not involve discrimination 
against religious minorities or aliens; it did not address discrimination in the 
provision of services; it did not concern discrimination in financing or 
advertising; nor did it involve the issue of monetary, as opposed to 
injunctive, relief.138  Section 1982 was not an open housing law.139 
The majority brushed away as dictum Chief Justice Vinson’s implication 
in Hurd that § 1982 was a Fourteenth Amendment statute and required state 
action—the implication that had so troubled both Judge Regan and Judge 
Blackmun.140  Hurd, in the Court’s opinion, was a Shelley-like case 
involving federal court assistance in the enforcement of a racially restrictive 
covenant.  Hurd “did not present the question whether purely private 
discrimination, unaided by any action on the part of government would 
violate § 1982.”141 
Jones involved simple statutory interpretation.  The statute, “[i]n plain 
and unambiguous terms . . . grants to all citizens, without regard to race or 
color, ‘the same right’ to purchase and lease property ‘as is enjoyed by 
white citizens.’”142  The Court adopted the functionalist view that Judge 
Blackmun had mooted in his opinion, recognizing that private power can 
have the same effect as public power:  “[W]henever property is placed on 
the market for whites only, whites have a right denied to Negroes.”143  The 
Court recognized the “revolutionary implications of so literal a reading of § 
1982” but concluded that Congress had, in fact, meant “exactly what it 
said.”144 
The Court rejected Mayer’s argument that the 1866 Act only addressed 
the Black Codes, laws designed to reduce black citizens to serfdom.145  
Instead, Congress “had before it an imposing body of evidence pointing to 
 
 137. This qualification is a product of the history of the deliberation.  In conference, Chief 
Justice Warren had urged the other Court members to reverse on the ground of Marsh.  To 
him, a real estate development like Paddock Woods sufficiently emulated a municipality to 
be a “state actor.”  All of the Justices agreed with Chief Justice Warren.  But Justice Stewart, 
apparently at the urging of his clerk, Laurence Tribe, pushed the Court to use the broader 
construction of the 1866 Act to overturn the decision; Stewart persuaded six of his 
colleagues, but lost Justices Harlan and White in the process. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 
SUPER CHIEF:  EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT:  A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 702–03 
(1983); see also MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, 1953–
1969, at 175 (2005). 
 138. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413–14.  Doubtlessly, the majority’s hedge was in reaction to 
Justice Harlan’s dissent, which viewed the entire exercise of interpreting both § 1982 and the 
Thirteenth Amendment as improvident given Congress’s passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968 and its open housing provisions. See infra notes 159–68 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413–14. 
 140. See id. at 419–20. 
 141. Id. at 419. 
 142. Id. at 420 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000)).  
 143. Id. at 421 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33, 43 (8th Cir. 1967)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144. Id. at 422. 
 145. Id. at 426. 
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the mistreatment of Negroes by private individuals and unofficial groups, 
mistreatment unrelated to any hostile state legislation.”146  Congress 
employed the broad language of the Act specifically to sweep in these 
purely private actors.147 
Contrary to Judge Blackmun’s opinion, congressional re-enactment of 
the 1866 Act in 1870, after the states’ ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, did not implicitly repeal the Act’s application to private 
behavior.  “[I]t would obviously make no sense to assume, without any 
historical support whatever, that Congress made a silent decision in 1870 to 
exempt private discrimination from the operation of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.”148 
The Court then turned to the uncontested question of whether the 
Thirteenth Amendment authorized such a broad and revolutionary statute.  
Justice Stewart began with the text of the Thirteenth Amendment itself:  
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.  Congress shall 
have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”149 
Justice Stewart reiterated that the Thirteenth Amendment was “not a 
mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an 
absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in 
any part of the United States.”150  Nevertheless, his opinion did not actually 
define what “slavery” meant beyond “compelled service.”151  In avoiding 
this critical issue, his opinion created a tension between the constitutional 
prohibition in Section 1 and the congressional power in Section 2 of the 
amendment.  That tension has bedeviled interpreters ever since. 
Instead of lingering on Section 1, Justice Stewart deferred to Congress.  
Section 2 of the Amendment empowered Congress to enact laws “direct and 
primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State 
legislation or not.”152  Congress’s authority to “enforce the article by 
appropriate legislation” was as broad a grant of power as that bestowed by 
the Necessary and Proper Clause.153  Congress could use this authority to 
direct laws, not simply at slavery as personal servitude, but at all the 
“badges and the incidents of slavery” that Congress could rationally 
determine.154  Private discrimination in the sale of real estate had the effect 
of “herd[ing] men into ghettos and [making] their ability to buy property 
 
 146. Id. at 427; see also id. at 428–29 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 17–
25, 95, 1833, 1835 (1866)). 
 147. Id. at 437. 
 148. Id. 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 150. Jones, 392 U.S. at 438 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151. The scope of Section 1 was not “a question . . . involved in this case.” Id. at 439. 
 152. Id. at 438 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23). 
 153. Id. (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20). 
 154. Id. at 440–41. 
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turn on the color of their skin” and was thus a “relic of slavery” that 
Congress could legitimately proscribe.155 
Justice William O. Douglas wrote an impassioned concurrence:  “While 
the institution [of slavery] has been outlawed, it has remained in the minds 
and hearts of many white men.”156  He then catalogued the myriad ways in 
which the Court had confronted the “spectacle of slavery unwilling to 
die.”157  From racial discrimination in jury selection to school segregation; 
from antimiscegenation laws to discrimination at amusement parks; all 
these instances confirmed Frederick Douglass’s lament that, though the 
black man had “ceased to be the slave of an individual,” he had now “in 
some sense become the slave of society.”158 
Justices Harlan and Byron White dissented.  Writing for the dissent, 
Justice Harlan stated that he viewed the Court’s foray into the Thirteenth 
Amendment as both “ill-considered and ill-advised.”159  The decision was 
ill-advised because Congress had just passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1968,160 which included among its provisions open housing regulations 
aimed at those who refuse to sell based on race, color, national origin, and 
sex.161  That the 1968 Civil Rights Act would not help the Joneses was 
insubstantial:  “I deem it far more important that this Court should avoid, if 
possible, the decision of constitutional and unusually difficult statutory 
questions than that we fulfill the expectations of every litigant who appears 
before us.”162  According to Harlan, the writ should have been dismissed as 
“improvidently granted.”163 
The decision was ill-considered because neither the text nor the 
legislative history supported the Court’s expansive view of the Act’s 
prohibitions.164  First, the Act itself, as passed in 1866, included two 
sections, the first granting citizenship and including the language now in § 
1982: 
 
 155. Id. at 442–43.  Finally, lest there be any doubt, the Court overruled its opinion in 
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), a case involving private terror aimed at blacks 
who had sought work at a sawmill.  The Hodges Court had concluded that “mere personal 
assault or trespass or appropriation” could not reduce a person to the condition of slavery. 
Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 n.78 (quoting Hodges, 203 U.S. at 18) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Only conduct that actually enslaved a person could be proscribed by congressional 
Thirteenth Amendment power. Id.  The Court overruled Hodges to the extent that Hodges 
conflicted with the Jones opinion. Id. 
 156. Jones, 392 U.S. at 445 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 447 (quoting Frederick Douglass, The Color Line, 132 N. AM. REV. 567, 568 
(1881), in 4 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS:  RECONSTRUCTION AND 
AFTER 342, 344 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1955)). 
 159. Id. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 160. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 
25 U.S.C.). 
 161. Jones, 392 U.S. at 477–78 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 162. Id. at 479. 
 163. Id. at 480. 
 164. Justice Harlan included this argument in his dissent, notwithstanding his admonition 
that such constitutional digressions were unwise. 
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[S]uch citizens, of every race and color . . . , shall have the same right . . . 
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.165 
The second section, later recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 242, stated that “any 
person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, shall subject . . . any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the 
deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act . . . shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor.”166  Justice Harlan construed these passages of the 
Act to guarantee only a right to “equal status under the law,” not an 
“‘absolute’ right enforceable against private individuals.”167  Individual acts 
that did not fall within the ambit of “state or community authority,” whether 
in the form of law or “custom,” were not covered by the Act.168 
Justice Harlan also painstakingly critiqued the majority’s reliance on 
legislative history.  He focused on the sentiments of Senator Lyman 
Trumbull, who indicated that both sections 1 and 2 of the Act were aimed at 
state action alone.169  Harlan noted that Representative James Falconer 
Wilson, the bill’s House sponsor, had stated that the “entire structure of this 
bill rests on the discrimination relative to civil rights and immunities made 
by the States on ‘account of race, color, or previous condition of 
slavery.’”170  Representative Samuel Shellabarger stated that section 1’s  
whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require that 
whatever . . . rights and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be for 
 
 165. Jones, 392 U.S. at 453–54 (alterations in original) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2000))) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 166. Id. at 454 (quoting § 2, 14 Stat. at 27 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 242 
(2006))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167. Id. at 453. 
 168. Id. at 454.  Justice Harlan’s concession that some private behavior may be covered 
by the Act, when so prevalent as to become “custom,” is an important recognition of the 
effects of collective, but nonlegal, private behavior.  Barry Sullivan has explained Justice 
Harlan’s concession as “not grounded in the legislative materials, but rather in Justice 
Harlan’s intellectual need to reconcile Congress’[s] clear intention to reach some private 
action with his general ‘state action’ approach to the statute.” Barry Sullivan, Historical 
Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 
541, 558–59 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
 169. Jones, 392 U.S. at 458–59.  For example, Justice Harlan pointed to Senator 
Trumbull’s remarks in January of 1866, to the effect that the Act 
will have no operation in any State where the laws are equal, where all persons 
have the same civil rights without regard to color or race.  It will have no operation 
in the State of Kentucky when her slave code and all her laws discriminating 
between persons on account of race or color shall be abolished. 
Id. at 459 (emphasis omitted) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170. Id. at 465 (emphasis omitted) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 
(1866)). 
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and upon all citizens alike . . . .  The bill does not reach mere private 
wrongs, but only those done under color of state authority . . . .171   
Curiously, however, Justice Harlan ventured that certain types of 
aggregated private discrimination—for example, boycotting of certain black 
workers by white employers—could fall within the Act’s prohibitions on 
discriminatory “customs.”172  But in that case, the proper analysis was not 
the Act’s compliance with the Thirteenth Amendment prohibitions on 
private conduct, but the individual discriminator’s act as part of a 
proscribed “custom.”173 
The opinion garnered mixed reviews in the popular and the academic 
press.  In St. Louis, the Post-Dispatch ran a front page article describing the 
decision as “sweeping.”174  An editorial cartoon the following day depicted 
a wrecking ball with the words “Supreme Court” smashing into a 
(presumably Jim) crow’s birdhouse labeled “Housing Discrimination.”175  
An accompanying editorial trumpeted the decision as having “restor[ed] . . . 
the full meaning of the Constitution for minority groups.”176  In academic 
circles, reaction ranged from the jubilant to the skeptical. 
Arthur Kinoy of Rutgers University claimed that Jones had finally 
“proclaimed an historical truth . . . that the structure of human slavery was 
never fully uprooted . . . and that America’s black citizens continue to be 
oppressed by the remaining existence of the badges and indicia of the 
supposedly outlawed system.”177  Robert Kohl celebrated Jones as 
“patently a landmark decision,” one that, if anything, had been too timid in 
its construction of the 1866 Act.178 
By contrast, Gerhard Casper acknowledged “that the Court [was] under 
pressure of its own . . . [in] the hot spring of 1968,” and that turning down 
the Joneses’ case would have been difficult.179  Still, he chastised the Court 
for establishing an “ill-reasoned rule” and “misunderstanding . . . the 
Court’s function.”180  In an article in the Vanderbilt Law Review, Senator 
 
 171. Id. at 467 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 172. See id. at 470–71. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Thomas W. Ottenad, Court Bars Race Bias in Home Sale, Rental in Ruling on St. 
Louis Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 17, 1968, at 1A. 
 175. See Demolition Project, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 18, 1968, at 2B. 
 176. Editorial, Wherever a Man Can Live, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 18, 1968, at 
2B. 
 177. Arthur Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.:  An Historic Step Forward, 22 VAND. 
L. REV. 475, 477 (1969). 
 178. Robert L. Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last:  Jones 
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272, 272, 300 (1969). 
 179. See Casper, supra note 22, at 132. 
 180. Id.  For modern criticism of the Jones decision, see David P. Currie, The Civil War 
Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131 (2006).  While generally supportive of the importance of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, Professor Currie suggests that the Jones Court was wrong to 
conclude that the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes congressional legislation aimed at 
“ordinary racial discrimination.” Id. at 1177. 
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Sam J. Ervin, Jr., of North Carolina, railed that “[t]he Jones case is a glaring 
example of the Court’s habit of effecting constitutional revision by judicial 
fiat.”181  The result was a decision that was “enough to make historical, 
linguistic, and constitutional angels weep.”182  In the Harvard Law Review, 
Louis Henkin wondered “why the Court could not resist the temptation to 
find in the [1866 Act] what, by a fair reading, no Congress ever put 
there.”183  Henkin went on to characterize the Court’s reasoning as “surely 
disingenuous, and border[ing] on chutzpah.”184  Common to these 
criticisms is a sense that the Court had been cavalier with both the history 
of the Act and the text of the Constitution.185  But this sense is mistaken. 
II.  CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866:  PRIVATE, PUBLIC, AND 
PRIVATE/PUBLIC DISCRIMINATION 
A.  Racial Cartels 
The Jones Court acknowledged a functional reality of discrimination.  
The right to acquire property on the same terms as whites “can be impaired 
as effectively by ‘those who place property on the market’ as by the State 
itself.”186  Temporarily putting aside normative views on appropriate 
canons of constitutional or statutory construction, the decision admits                                                   
a certain realist logic.  A black man who cannot buy because no individual 
will sell to him is not in any material way different from a black man who 
cannot buy because the law says no individual may sell to him.  Similarly, a 
group of individuals who agree not to sell to blacks through private 
agreement are functionally no different from a group of individuals who 
agree not to sell to blacks through public enactment.  As Louis Jaffe noted 
as early as 1937, “property (of which contract and the right to contract, is an 
instance) equips the possessor with great powers of exclusion—enforced or 
sanctioned by the law . . . and this power to exclude is a source of 
regulating others’ conduct.”187  Whether one is coerced by private 
 
 181. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.:  Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 
VAND. L. REV. 485, 485 (1969). 
 182. Id. at 502. 
 183. Louis Henkin, Foreword:  On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 86 (1968). 
 184. Id. at 86; see also 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES:  RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–88, PART ONE, at 1258 (Paul A. 
Freund ed., 1971) (“In Jones v. Mayer the Court appears to have had no feeling for the truth 
of history, but only to have read it through the glass of the Court’s own purpose.  It allowed 
itself to believe impossible things—as though the dawning enlightenment of 1968 could be 
ascribed to the Congress of a century agone.” (footnote omitted)). 
 185. See infra Part III. 
 186. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420–21 (1968) (quoting Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33, 43 (8th Cir. 1967)). 
 187. Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 217 (1937), 
reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 115, 118 (William W. Fisher, Morton J. Horwitz & 
Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993). 
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agreement or one is coerced by public law, one is still coerced.188  The 
Jones case appears to be one of the first to recognize the economic 
equivalence between private racial discrimination and public racial 
discrimination.189  In doing so, it anticipates the economic arguments 
evaluating antidiscrimination legislation of the past thirty years. 
Racial discrimination is a form of cartel behavior.190  Groups, knitted 
together by ties of kinship, race, culture, or custom—and holding levers of 
power desired by other groups—agree formally or informally to minimize 
competition by these other groups.  However, cartels are notoriously 
fragile—members are constantly lured by the promise of personal gain to 
“defect” or “cheat.”191  For that reason, governments, through coercive 
legislation, can prolong the life of the cartel by punishing those who would 
otherwise defect.192  Such was the case of the Jim Crow laws enforcing 
segregation after Reconstruction.  An individual white could have 
maximized his or her material welfare by, for example, hiring and 
promoting skilled black workers or expanding the individual’s consumer 
market to include blacks.  The reason whites did not do so was due to the 
power of criminal sanction.193  Free market devotees believe that, absent 
such active enforcement by governments—now clearly illegal under Equal 
Protection principles—rational self-interest will inevitably lead to cartel 
disintegration.194 
However, McAdams has posed a separate theory for why cartels might 
survive, even in the absence of coercive legislation punishing defectors.  
McAdams shows how racial discrimination produces group status 
benefits—such as prestige—that do not fit neatly within the material 
welfare-maximizing framework of classical economics.  In particular, 
McAdams argues that racial discrimination serves to produce group status 
 
 188. See generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923), reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra 
note 187, at 101. 
 189. In saying this, this Article does not adhere to the argument that the public/private 
distinction should carry no weight whatsoever.  As Mark Rosen has pointed out, as a 
descriptive matter, the distinction persists, notwithstanding arguments for its dissolution.  
Further, as a political matter, the distinction helps corral an otherwise incomprehensible 
collection of forces into manageable categories. See Rosen, supra note 51, at 471–73. 
 190. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 
153–56 (1994); Roithmayr, supra note 8, at 754–55; Thomas & Rich, supra note 8, at 309–
10.  This Article adopts the looser notion of cartel expressed by Roithmayr and others.  It 
does not suggest that racial discrimination must meet all of the formal requirements of a 
cartel as a term of art in antitrust doctrine. 
 191. McAdams, supra note 8, at 1070–71; see also Cooter, supra note 190, at 153. 
 192. Cooter, supra note 190, at 153. 
 193. In the absence of criminal sanction, whites were induced to comply by threat of 
extralegal violence against “race traitors.” See Epstein, supra note 8, at 1100.  Richard 
Epstein argues against Richard McAdams’s theory that status production alone can sustain 
race-based cartels. See generally id.  The author’s intent is not to engage in that debate, but 
to argue that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, congressional debate over 
Reconstruction legislation reveals pointed concern with private cartel-like behavior among 
whites. 
 194. Id. at 1085–88. 
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benefits for whites, and that these group status benefits explain why racial 
cartels can survive despite the seduction of personal material gain by 
individual members of the group who would otherwise cheat:195   
[T]he cartel-like behavior of whites serves to maximize the non-material 
end of status production (the cartel seeks to monopolize social status) and 
. . . the cartel employs the non-material means of intra-group status 
rewards and punishments.  If this fundamental point is right, then social 
norms can support discrimination notwithstanding market competition.196 
Similarly, Roithmayr has used the economic term “market lock-in” to 
describe the persistent effects of discrimination even after formal legal 
disability has been removed.  Using legal education as an example, she 
challenges the traditional model of law school education and career 
prospects as too reliant on a neoclassical model of the market, in which 
“meritocratic competition promotes efficiency—it selects the applicants 
who will maximize the value of a job slot or an educational opportunity.”197  
Instead, according to Roithmayr, the implements of past de jure 
discrimination in the legal field, the rise of the law schools, the creation of 
the bar examination, and the decline of the apprenticeship model for lawyer 
certification led to a “market lock-in” that systematically disadvantaged 
African American candidates.198  This system persists even after de jure 
discrimination has ended, because switching costs of moving to another 
type of system are prohibitive.  The system, even though nominally neutral, 
creates a barrier to entry for blacks to compete in the marketplace.199 
Jones’s recognition of the functional reality of private and public 
discrimination presage these sophisticated economic arguments.  When 
Justice Stewart conceded that private discrimination can have as pernicious 
an effect as public discrimination, and when he recognized that the Thirty-
ninth Congress had evidence of that type of collusive behavior, Stewart 
accepted a type of market-corrective purpose of the 1866 Act.  As Ayres 
has noted, “the same equal protection norm undergirds the social concern 
with both civil rights and antitrust discrimination.”200  However, up until 
now, few have linked this important line of economics scholarship with the 
actual historical record from the 1866 Act.201 
 
 195. See McAdams, supra note 8, at 1045–47.  This group status production behavior also 
may help explain why socially ambitious racial and ethnic groups have discriminated against 
African Americans in America, even when those groups have themselves been subject to 
discrimination by others. See id. at 1055–56. 
 196. Id. at 1070. 
 197. Roithmayr, supra note 8, at 729–30. 
 198. Id. at 775. 
 199. Id. at 775–76. 
 200. Ayres, supra note 8, at 679. 
 201. A couple of notable exceptions to this include G. Sidney Buchanan, who remarked 
that the Jones decision’s significance “lies in its recognition of the direct tie between private 
racial discrimination and economic disability.” G. SIDNEY BUCHANAN, THE QUEST FOR 
FREEDOM:  A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 138 (1976).  Also important 
is David E. Bernstein’s work on post–Civil War restrictions on African American travel. See 
generally David E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post–Civil War Restrictions on 
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B.  The Reconstruction Dilemma 
In 1866, Congress confronted three distinct, but interwoven, problems in 
its attempt to protect freedmen.  The first, and most obvious, was the 
problem of de jure discrimination by recusant state and municipal 
legislatures.  The Black Codes, as has been exhaustively explored, were 
various labor, vagrancy, apprenticeship, and other regulations enacted by 
Southerners to replicate the social and economic system of the plantation 
society.  So, for instance, in Mississippi, blacks had to certify in writing that 
they had employment for the upcoming year and had to remain in such 
employment for that year.202  If they left their jobs early, they forfeited their 
earned wages and could be arrested by any white citizen.203  South Carolina 
forbade blacks from working in any position other than laborer or farmer 
unless they paid an annual tax.204 
Although scholars still debate the effectiveness of the Black Codes,205 
there can be no doubt that the former Confederate states’ efforts to mimic 
the slave system irritated Republicans in Congress, as well as Northerners 
in general.206  The Congressional Globe at this time is replete with 
Republican excoriations of the South.207 
In an often quoted passage, Representative Martin Russell Thayer 
declared in exasperation that his vote for the Thirteenth Amendment did not 
offer the freedmen “a mere paper guarantee.”208  Representative Samuel 
Wheeler Moulton stated that the 1866 Act would vindicate the right of 
blacks to free labor unimpeded by state law:  “[W]here a State says . . . that 
the black man shall not make contracts, that the black man shall not enjoy 
the fruits of his labor . . . such discrimination shall not exist.”209  
Congressman William Lawrence stated that the Act protected the right to 
“personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy 
property” as well as the “necessary incidents of these . . . rights,” such as 
the “right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy 
 
Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781 (1998).  Bernstein 
ultimately concludes, along with Richard Epstein, that whites turned to law and private 
violence because, “[a]s economic theory would predict, white planters were unable to form a 
successful voluntary cartel to stifle the free labor market.” Id. at 784.  Again, this Article’s 
aim is not to debate the wisdom of the Civil Rights Acts, but to argue that they had a cartel-
busting purpose, irrespective of necessity. 
 202. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION:  1863–1877, 
at 199 (Perennial Classics 2002) (1988). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 200. 
 205. Compare, e.g., Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 
50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (1952) (arguing that the Black Codes had effectively returned 
African Americans to the condition of slavery), with Sullivan, supra note 168, at 551–52 
(stating that the Union Army and Freedmen’s Bureau effectively suppressed the Black 
Codes). 
 206. See FONER, supra note 202, at 200. 
 207. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 588–89 (1866) (citing the various Black 
Laws of Southern states). 
 208. Id. at 1151; see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 433–34 (1968). 
 209. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES 140 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967). 
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property, and to share the benefit of laws for the security of person and 
property.”210  Such rights, Lawrence went on to explain, are those “inherent 
and indestructible” rights of American citizenship, “absolute rights which 
pertain to every citizen, which are inherent, and of which a State cannot 
constitutionally deprive him.”211 
The second problem was state inaction.212  As Representative Wilson 
lamented even before the end of the war,  
Legislatures, courts, [e]xecutives, almost every person holding political or 
social power and position in the southern States, were all arrayed on the 
side of slavery, and what they could not accomplish was turned over to 
the mob, which, without law . . . did its work with fearful accuracy and 
terrible exactness.213 
White authorities simply would not enforce laws designed to protect 
freedmen, whether those laws came from Congress or from otherwise 
generally applicable law.  After the war, Representative Lawrence 
summarized the problem in the recusant South:  “Now, there are two ways 
in which a State may undertake to deprive citizens of [their] rights:  either 
by prohibitory laws, or by a failure to protect any one of them.”214  
Lawrence continued, “If the State should simply enact laws for native-born 
citizens and provide no law under which naturalized citizens could enjoy 
any one of these rights, and should deny them all protection by civil process 
or penal enactments, that would be a denial of justice.”215  Lawrence went 
on to argue specifically for the “present necessity for this bill,” which was 
“[t]he fact that no single southern Legislature has yet recognized the rights 
of blacks to the civil rights accorded to every white alien.”216 
 
 210. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866); see also Robert J. Kaczorowski, 
The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866:  A Legislative History in Light 
of Runyon v. McCrary, 98 YALE L.J. 565, 572 (1989). 
 211. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866); see also Kaczorowski, supra note 
210, at 572. 
 212. The Thirteenth Amendment coverage of state inaction has been a feature of several 
scholars’ legal arguments. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as 
Slavery:  A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1381 
(1992) (“[T]he absence of a state action requirement in the Thirteenth Amendment means 
not only that certain private action is banned, but also that certain state inaction is 
prohibited.”); see also William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment:  
Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1323–24 n.32 
(2007) (opining that “the Thirteenth Amendment creates plenary power for the federal 
government to override state action or remedy state inaction that results in violations of the 
rights of national citizenship”). 
 213. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864). 
 214. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866) (emphasis added). 
 215. Id.  Rep. William Lawrence’s discussion of “naturalized” versus “native-born” 
citizens reflects a simmering debate in Congress over whether African Americans born as 
slaves in the United States could automatically claim to be citizens once emancipated, or 
whether that citizenship required a second affirmative step by Congress through the Civil 
Rights Act, or through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 216. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Congress’s third, and most intractable, problem was discriminatory 
private action.  At its most crude, this private discrimination manifested 
itself as racial vigilantism217 or as the terrorist activities of organizations 
such as the Ku Klux Klan.218  Even whites with no financial stake in 
slavery used violence to enforce the former slave owner’s perceived 
property rights—a type of racially motivated behavior reflecting the group 
status benefits described by McAdams.  In his 1865 Report on the 
Condition of the South, Carl Schurz highlights this phenomenon: 
Not only the former slaveholders, but the non-slaveholding whites, who, 
even previous to the war, seemed to be more ardent in their pro-slavery 
feelings than the planters themselves, are possessed by a singularly bitter 
and vindictive feeling against the colored race since the negro has ceased 
to be property.  The pecuniary value which the individual negro formerly 
represented having disappeared, the maiming and killing of colored men 
seems to be looked upon by many as one of those venial offences which 
must be forgiven to the outraged feelings of a wronged and robbed 
people.219 
 
 217. Carl Schurz, commissioned by the U.S. government to investigate the progress of 
Reconstruction, commented in his report on Southerners’ behavior,  
  A belief, conviction, or prejudice, or whatever you may call it, so widely spread 
and apparently so deeply rooted as this, that the negro will not work without 
physical compulsion, is certainly calculated to have a very serious influence upon 
the conduct of the people entertaining it.  It naturally produced a desire to preserve 
slavery in its original form as much and as long as possible . . . . [T]he main 
agency employed for that purpose was force and intimidation.  In many instances 
negroes who walked away from the plantations, or were found upon the roads, 
were shot or otherwise severely punished, which was calculated to produce the 
impression among those remaining with their masters that an attempt to escape 
from slavery would result in certain destruction. 
CARL SCHURZ, REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE SOUTH, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-2 (1865), 
reprinted in 1 CARL SCHURZ, SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL 
SCHURZ 279, 311 (Frederic Bancroft ed., 1913). 
 218. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual 
Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1386 (2000) (noting that the Klan “intimidated, 
whipped, and beat blacks into signing onerous labor contracts,” and that this violence 
increased from 1866 through the 1870s); see also BULLWHIP DAYS:  THE SLAVES REMEMBER 
398 (James Mellon ed., 1988) [hereinafter BULLWHIP DAYS] (relating statements of Parilee 
Daniels, a former slave who recounted that “[i]f we left our white people and tried to get 
work, the KKKs said no”); cf. Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights 
Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981, 984 (2002) (noting rise of the Klan as 
motivation for passage of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 219. SCHURZ, supra note 217, at 317.  Schurz went on to state,   
Although it is admitted that [the freedman] has ceased to be the property of a 
master, it is not admitted that he has a right to become his own master.  As Colonel 
Thomas, assistant-commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau in Mississippi, in a 
letter addressed to me, very pungently expresses it: 
The whites esteem the blacks their property by natural right, and, however 
much they may admit that the relations of masters and slaves have been 
destroyed by the war and by the President’s emancipation proclamation, they 
still have an ingrained feeling that the blacks at large belong to the whites at 
large, and whenever opportunity serves, they treat the colored people just as 
their profit, caprice or passion may dictate. 
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At its most insidious, private discrimination manifested itself in 
collective behavior that later Congresses would come to call 
“anticompetitive,” “monopolistic,” or “cartel.”220  For example, Rosa 
Pollard, a former slave, recalled that “[i]n them days, the Negroes could not 
get out and get jobs, like they can now.”221  Instead, if a freedman went to a 
white man and asked for work, “he asked us, ‘Aren’t you livin’ with so-an’-
so?’  We say, ‘Yes, sir.’  Then, he would say to us, ‘You will have to go to 
him with your trouble.  He is your boss.’  And that was exactly what we had 
to do.”222 
A contemporary planter in Alabama pledged his life that each freedman 
was “going to be made a serf.”  He then explained how this would happen: 
It won’t need any law for that.  Planters will have an understanding 
among themselves:  “You won’t hire my niggers, and I won’t hire yours”; 
then what’s left for them?  They’re attached to the soil, and we’re as much 
their masters as ever.  I’ll stake my life, this is the way it will work.223 
Planters used a variety of anticompetitive schemes to keep blacks in line—
wage fixing, model contracts, labor market division, capital boycotts, 
service tying224—schemes that are now core targets of antitrust 
enforcement.225  Sometimes these combinations were overt, sometimes they 
were tacitly accepted by the local Freedmen’s Bureau, and sometimes they 
were unspoken but understood.226 
Representative William Windom read into the record a letter from a 
Union colonel in Texas to a general at the Freedmen’s Bureau: 
Sir:  I . . . report that in some portions of this State the negroes are not yet 
free, that a pass system is still in force, and when a freedman is found at 
large without a pass, he is taken up and whipped. 
 
Id. at 320 (quoting Letter from Colonel Samuel Thomas, Assistant Comm’r, Freedmen’s 
Bureau, State of Miss.). 
 220. See infra text accompanying notes 224–25. 
 221. BULLWHIP DAYS, supra note 218, at 398. 
 222. Id. 
 223. LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG:  THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 415 
(1980) (emphasis added) (quoting J.T. TROWBRIDGE, THE SOUTH:  A TOUR OF ITS BATTLE-
FIELDS AND RUINED CITIES (Arno Press 1969) (1866)). 
 224. See id. at 415–16.  For example, in addition to setting maximum wages and 
conspiring to draft model labor contracts, planters agreed not to hire other planters’ workers 
and agreed not to lease or sell property to freedmen. Id.  In one South Carolina community, 
doctors would not treat freedmen without the consent of the planter. Id. at 415. 
 225. See e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.2 (2000) (identifying price or output fixing, bid 
rigging, and market division agreements as per se violations of antitrust law), reprinted in 
CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW:  INTERPRETATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION, app. C-6 (2d ed. 2002). See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW §§ 17, 19 (3d ed. 2004) (describing tying 
agreements and horizontal restraints of trade). Cf. id. § 19.03a (noting that “[h]orizonal 
agreements are antitrust’s most ‘suspect’ classification”). 
 226. See LITWACK, supra note 223, at 415–16 (noting that, even where the local 
Freedmen’s Bureau broke up a combination, “planters kept themselves informed of what 
their neighbors were paying [for labor] and paid no more”). 
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That a freedman is not allowed to hire out without written permission 
from his former master; at least planters have held meetings and have 
agreed not to hire freed people without such permission.227 
Windom bitterly complained that “[p]lanters combine together to compel 
[the freedmen] to work for such wages as their former masters may dictate, 
and deny them the privilege of hiring to any one without the consent of the 
master; . . . .  Sir, if this be liberty, may none ever know what slavery is.”228  
Representative Ignatius Donnelly put it more bluntly:  “The slave now has a 
mob for his master.”229 
Worse, private restraints often worked in concert with facially neutral 
law.  Freedmen were continually whipsawed by private discrimination and 
public censure.230  Combinations of whites kept blacks from working or 
owning property, while ostensibly race-neutral vagrancy laws put them in 
prison for not working or owning property.231  As Schurz reported, 
The negro is not only not permitted to be idle, but he is positively 
prohibited from working or carrying on a business for himself; he is 
compelled to be in the “regular service” of a white man, and if he has no 
employer he is compelled to find one.  It requires only a simple 
understanding among the employers, and the negro is just as much bound 
to his employer “for better and for worse” as he was when slavery existed 
in the old form.  If he should attempt to leave his employer on account of 
non-payment of wages or bad treatment he is compelled to find another 
one; and if no other will take him he will be compelled to return to him 
from whom he wanted to escape.232 
 
 227. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1160 (1866) (statement of Rep. Windom) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Letter from Colonel DeGauss to Oliver O. Howard, Major Gen., 
Freedmen’s Bureau (Dec. 15, 1865)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 228. Id.  A complement to these informal arrangements was the pernicious effect of so-
called “enticement laws,” which made whites criminally or civilly liable for “enticing” away 
black servants through financial inducements.  As William Cohen has written, “[m]ore than 
any other form of legislation, the enticement acts embodied the essence of the system of 
involuntary servitude.  They re-created in modified form the proprietary relationship that had 
existed between master and slave.” William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the 
South, 1865–1940:  A Preliminary Analysis, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORDER:  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 319 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 
1978). 
 229. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 589 (1866). 
 230. It should be remembered, after all, that the Thirteenth Amendment’s text preserves 
involuntary servitude “as a punishment for crime.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 231. These laws “made no reference to race, to avoid the appearance of discrimination . . . .  
But it was well understood . . . that ‘the vagrant contemplated was the plantation negro.’” 
FONER, supra note 202, at 201 (quoting Alabama planter and Democratic “politico” John W. 
DuBois).  Eric Foner also notes that, even though most Southern states had repealed the 
codes applying only to blacks, “Southern courts continued to enforce vagrancy, breach of 
contract, and apprenticeship statutes that made no direct reference to race.” Id. at 209. 
 232. SCHURZ, supra note 217, at 325 (third emphasis added).  Moreover, local law 
essentially deputized every white citizen with the ability to enforce these restrictions.  As 
Schurz described it,  
[T]he summary enforcement of the penalties . . . place the freedmen under a sort of 
permanent martial law, while the provision investing every white man with the 
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Whites would not sign contracts to permit blacks to work.  In one telling 
instance, a Freedmen’s Bureau official reported that a local ordinance 
required a bond for $500 before a person could work as a drayman, but that 
“‘the white citizens refuse[d] to sign any bonds for the freedmen.’”233  The 
reason for this activity was expressly anticompetitive:  “‘The white citizens 
and authorities say that it is for their interest to drive out all independent 
negro labor.’”234  Schurz went on to say that he “found several instances of 
a similar character in the course of [his] observations, of which [he] 
neglected to procure the documentary evidence.”235 
This problem of private restraints on the freedman’s ability to work 
goaded one congressman to ask, “Now are these men free?  If a man can be 
sold as a vagrant because he does not labor, without any inquiry as to 
whether he can or cannot procure labor, is he a freeman?”236 
 
power and authority of a police officer as against every black man subjects them to 
the control even of those individuals who in other communities are thought hardly 
fit to control themselves.  On the whole, this piece of legislation is a striking 
embodiment of the idea that although the former owner has lost his individual right 
of property in the former slave, the blacks at large belong to the whites at large.  
Id. at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In this sense, the immediate postemancipation 
period changed little from the former slave period, which forced whites to treat all blacks as 
presumptive slaves. See Stringfield v. State, 25 Ga. 474 (1858), in which an individual was 
found guilty of a misdemeanor for trading with a slave, even though it was never established 
that the defendant knew that the black man was in fact a slave.  In the words of the court, “In 
this State every negro is presumed to be a slave and to have an owner, and proof of his color 
is sufficient prima facie evidence of his being a slave and supports that allegation.” Id. at 
476.  See also Mandeville v. Cookenderfer, 16 F. Cas. 580 (C.C.D.C. 1827) (No. 9009), in 
which a coach operator allowed an African American onto a coach out of the D.C. area.  
Chief Judge William Cranch stated in his opinion,  
Every negro is, by a rule of evidence well established in this part of the country, 
prima facie to be considered as a slave, and the property of somebody; and he, who 
acts in regard to him as if he were a free man, acts at his peril, and the burden of 
proof is upon him, to show that the negro is not a slave, or, at least, to show such 
circumstances as will rebut the presumption arising from color.  
Id. at 582. 
 233. SCHURZ, supra note 217, at 327 (quoting Letter from Samuel Thomas, supra note 
219). 
 234. Id. (quoting Letter from Samuel Thomas, supra note 219). 
 235. Id. 
 236. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1124 (1866), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION 
AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 209, at 168.  Representative Burton Chauncey Cook 
complained that “[a]ny combination of men in his neighborhood can prevent [the freedman] 
from having any chance to support himself by his labor.  They can pass a law that a man not 
supporting himself by labor shall be deemed a vagrant, and that a vagrant shall be sold.” 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1124 (1866); see also Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, supra note 128, at 60, reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 124, at 
259. 
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C.  The Civil Rights Act of 1866:  Passage, Veto, Override, and the 
Rise of Antitrust 
1.  Text and Passage 
Congress responded to these problems by, first, outlawing the Black 
Codes and criminally sanctioning their enforcers, second, outlawing the 
behavior of individuals who conspire to deprive an individual of civil 
rights—including outlawing the passivity of officials who know about, but 
do nothing to prevent, such a conspiracy—and third, targeting the actions of 
private collectives through the enigmatic term “custom.” 
There is some debate in the Congressional Globe as to whether the 1866 
Act was even necessary to outlaw the Black Codes.  Some Republican 
members of Congress argued that the Thirteenth Amendment, of its own 
force, nullified these laws.237  Without a doubt, however, the 1866 Act 
aimed at obliterating these local laws.  The Act identified the laws and 
made their enforcers targets of criminal sanction.238  Further, after the Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871, it became illegal for government officials to stand 
by when they have the ability to prevent the deprivation of another’s civil 
rights.239 
Congress’s attitude toward private discrimination, unaided by public 
action or inaction, was less clear.  As indicated above, Congress received 
ample evidence of discrimination by collectives of Southerners acting as 
legislatures, but it also heard evidence of discrimination perpetrated by 
collectives of Southerners acting in their private capacity.  And so, it 
enacted in section 1 of the 1866 Act that  
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition 
of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same right, in every 
State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to 
 
 237. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (remarks of Sen. 
Trumbull) (stating that all discriminatory statutes are “null and void” upon passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment). 
 238. Section 2 of the bill stated specifically, 
[t]hat any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or 
Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to 
different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any 
time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by 
reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by 
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, 
or both, in the discretion of the court. 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
242 (2006)). 
 239. Section 6 of that Act imposed liability on those who “hav[e] power to prevent or aid 
in preventing [any conspiracy designed to interfere with civil rights and] shall neglect or 
refuse to do so.” Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 13, 15 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986 (2000)). 
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sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, 
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 
and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.240 
The prohibition against “custom,” placed so curiously in the 1866 Act, 
has perplexed scholars and jurists for decades.241  Evidence of 
contemporary usage of the term supports the view that the term was used 
often, but not exclusively, to describe behavior touching on private 
economic relations.242  For example, a Texas planter in 1867 sanctioned the 
use of fixed pay scales and the driving out of those who “break[] the 
established custom.”243  An opponent of the 1866 Act asked whether it was 
now a form of slavery “for a religious society . . . in pursuance of its long-
established custom, to refuse a free negro the right to rent and occupy the 
most prominent pew in its church?”244 
This construction of the term “custom” is consonant with the way in 
which that term was understood by the drafters during the Reconstruction 
era.  Reconstruction lawyers were steeped in the common-law traditions of 
English legal luminaries such as William Blackstone and Edward Coke.245  
The term “custom,” as it was used in such traditions, could be understood as 
customary law, but also as praxis by the community,246 including the praxis 
among certain trade cartels or guilds.247  Guilds (a specific type of cartel)248 
 
 240. § 1, 14 Stat. at 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2000)). 
 241. Cf. Jonathan D. Martin, Note, Historians at the Gate:  Accommodating Expert 
Historical Testimony in Federal Courts, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1518, 1529–30 & nn.68–69 
(2003) (noting the discrepancy between historians filing amicus briefs arguing that “custom” 
clearly applied to private action and those providing a more nuanced treatment of the term). 
 242. Sullivan, supra note 168, at 558. 
 243. FONER, supra note 202, at 139 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 244. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1268 (1866), reprinted in THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 209, at 180; see also Beatty v. 
Gregory, 17 Iowa 109 (1864) (examining the general versus private custom in mining to 
determine mining rights). 
 245. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 712 (1997) (calling Blackstone a 
primary legal authority for nineteenth-century lawyers); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William 
Blackstone and the New American Republic:  A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 731, 767 (1976); George Rutherglen, Custom and Usage as Action Under Color of 
State Law:  An Essay on the Forgotten Terms of Section 1983, 89 VA. L. REV. 925, 930 
(2003) (noting that Blackstone’s “account of custom as a source of law was taken to be 
standard, both in England and in this country”). 
 246. See generally Andrea C. Loux, The Persistence of the Ancient Regime:  Custom, 
Utility, and the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 183 (1993). 
 247. See Clark v. Le Cren, (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 20, 22 (K.B.) (noting that the customs of 
certain workers can support a permissible restraint of trade); Rutherglen, supra note 245, at 
933 (noting that one of Blackstone’s categories of customs was “particular customs that 
persist in various localities or trades”); Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work:  
Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. 
REV. 721, 760 (2002) (“In the guild system, some of the obligations of both master and 
apprentice were provided by a contract, termed an indenture, but most were based on 
custom.”). 
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used these customs not only for internal dispute resolution and regulation, 
but also as a method of erecting barriers to entry or engaging in otherwise 
anticompetitive behavior.249 
Barry Sullivan has offered a most lucid explanation for Congress’s 
inclusion of “custom” in the bill.  In his estimation, the members of the 
Thirty-ninth Congress 
were confronted with a serious practical problem:  how to construct and 
implement a new labor system that was contrary to the deepest and most 
long-standing mores, customs, and practices of the South, the strength of 
which depended not simply, or even principally, on law, but on the most 
deeply held values of white society.250 
Congress used the word “custom,” then, to attack an economic reality of the 
slave system, in addition to the system’s legal incidents, by proscribing 
those privately enforced regulations that functioned to perpetuate aspects of 
the previous slave system.251 
Further, in the nineteenth century, the distinction between “custom” and 
“customary law” was “more permeable than it is now.”252  Custom referred 
to both customary practice in the community as well as customary law.  The 
use of the term “custom” in the Act, therefore, represents a compromise in 
Congress.  It was designed to “solve[] the main problem [Congress] faced 
during Reconstruction:  how to enforce federal rights in the South without 
establishing a national government [including a tort regime] that could 
entirely displace state law.”253  In other words, Congress, through 
regulation of “custom,” attempted to legislate against private collectives in 
a way that comported with stubborn, but crumbling, notions of traditional 
laissez-faire economics and classical legal thought.254 
 
 248. According to Judge Richard A. Posner, a guild is a type of cartel that is joined 
together by social and ideological ties. See Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of 
Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1993).  McAdams identifies the white cartels of the South 
as bound by ties of white supremacism. See McAdams, supra note 8, at 1070. 
 249. See Clark, 109 Eng. Rep. at 22; Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual 
Disempowerment of Employees, 46 STAN. L. REV. 87, 120 (1993) (“British guilds used this 
[apprenticeship] custom to limit entry into occupations.”). 
 250. Sullivan, supra note 168, at 556. 
 251. Id. at 558. 
 252. Rutherglen, supra note 17, at 333. 
 253. Id. 
 254. As Aviam Soifer argues, “The legal situation in the South at the end of the Civil War 
was a chaotic blend of old and quickly emerging doctrines in the ‘private law’ realms of 
property and contract law.” Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE 
L.J. 1916, 1941 (1987).  This sentiment is shared by a number of scholars. See, e.g., Martin 
S. Sheffer, Did the Framers Intend Their Intentions?:  Civil Rights, The Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Election Campaign of 1866, 12 CAP. U. L. REV. 45, 69 (1982) (“One 
must remember that nineteenth-century liberals defined freedom as the absence of 
institutional restraints. . . . The problem for the Radical Republicans . . . stems from the fact 
that they were not acting as nineteenth-century liberals.  Their approach to the issue of civil 
rights and the use of governmental machines was closer to methods adopted by the New 
Deal Democrats . . . .”); see also Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1428 (1982). 
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2.  Opposition, Veto, and Override 
The history of congressional and presidential opposition to the 1866 Act 
and contemporary legislation confirms that Congress’s aim was to regulate 
private as well as public collectives.  Undeniably, significant congressional 
opposition to the 1866 Act sounded in fear of a larger and more powerful 
federal government.255  Others made no apologies for opposing the bill 
based on white supremacy.256  However, opponents of the bill also made 
laissez-faire arguments that racial discrimination could not last, so long as 
there were no restraints on individual market choices. 
Democratic legislator John Hogan argued that any help for the freedmen 
was unnecessary.  Whites would recognize individual merit, and that would 
drive the former slave to advancement.  According to Hogan, now that the 
slaves were free, they freely could use “their character, . . . their industry,    
. . . their thrift, . . . their sobriety, . . . [and] their skill” to “elevate” 
themselves.257 
More pointedly, free market objection to Reconstruction featured 
prominently in President Johnson’s March 27, 1866, veto of the bill: 
 I do not propose to consider the policy of this bill.  To me the details of 
the bill seem fraught with evil.  The white race and the black race of the 
South have hitherto lived together under the relation of master and 
slave—capital owning labor.  Now, suddenly, that relation is changed, 
and as to ownership capital and labor are divorced.  They stand now each 
master of itself.  In this new relation, one being necessary to the other, 
there will be a new adjustment, which both are deeply interested in 
making harmonious.  Each has equal power in setting the terms, and if left 
to the laws that regulate capital and labor it is confidently believed that 
they will satisfactorily work out the problem.  Capital, it is true, has more 
intelligence, but labor is never so ignorant as not to understand its own 
interests, not to know its own value, and not to see that capital must pay 
that value 
 This bill frustrates this adjustment.  It intervenes between capital and 
labor and attempts to settle questions of political economy through the 
agency of numerous officials . . . .258 
 
 255. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 598 (1866) (“If [section 1 of the 1866 
Act] is not centralizing with a vengeance and by wholesale, I do not know what is.”); see 
also FONER, supra note 202, at 242 (“The [moderate Republican’s] dilemma was that most 
of the rights they sought to guarantee for blacks had always been state concerns.  Federal 
action to secure these rights raised the specter of an undue ‘centralization’ of power.”); 
Sheffer, supra note 254, at 46. 
 256.  For example, see the remarks of Delaware Senator Willard Saulsbury, Sr., who 
regarded the bill as “an insane effort to elevate the African race to the dignity of the white 
race.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1865). 
 257. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1823 (1866). 
 258. President Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Civil Rights Act (Mar. 27, 1866), reprinted 
in PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS:  THE SPEECHES, PROCLAMATIONS, AND POLICIES THAT HAVE 
SHAPED THE NATION FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 146, 149 (J.F. Watts & Fred L. Israel 
eds., 2000) (emphasis added). 
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Johnson vetoed the contemporaneous Freedmen’s Bureau Bill on similar 
laissez-faire grounds.  Johnson asserted that “[t]he laws that regulate supply 
and demand will maintain their force . . . .  There is no danger that the 
exceedingly great demand for labor will not operate in favor of the 
laborer.”259 
Republican congressional leaders were outraged by the vetoes.  Senator 
Lot Myrick Morrill of Maine derided the President’s naïve faith in the free 
market: 
[T]he black man cries to the nation for recognition of his manhood, for 
protection; the nation answers back, there is for you no justice, no 
protection, no courts, no rights, civil or political; in the language of the 
chief Executive, you are left to “the great law of supply and demand.”260 
On April 9, Congress overrode the veto of the Civil Rights Act.  The 
override signals a rejection of Johnson’s stated belief that the free market of 
its own accord would create the kind of equality of citizenship that the 
Reconstruction Congress had envisaged.  Upon passage, the New York 
Times predicted that “[t]he Civil Rights Bill has become law, and the 
obvious duty of the President now is to enforce it.  That he will do so, 
judiciously and faithfully, we are confident . . . .”261  A week later, 
thousands of African Americans filled the streets of Washington, D.C., to 
celebrate the first anniversary of emancipation.262 
However, nothing—not the legislature, not the army, not the free 
market—seemed able to stanch the desire of whites to humiliate their black 
fellow citizens.  The Black Codes gave way to continued domestic violence, 
disenfranchisement, and Jim Crow.  For Congress, this resistance proved a 
cause of wearying frustration and, after the Compromise of 1877,263 
resignation. 
3.  Civil Rights and the Beginning of Antitrust 
Eventually, the laissez-faire model that had colored the debates over the 
1866 Act gave way to a view of government as a more active market-
corrective force.  But not in the area of civil rights.  Instead, this new 
activism manifested itself in the area of economic policy and consumer 
protection.  The 1880s saw the aggregation of vast power and wealth in six 
 
 259. President Andrew Johnson, Veto of Freedman’s Bureau Bill (Feb. 19, 1866), 
reprinted in CIVIL RIGHTS AND AFRICAN AMERICANS 214, 216–17 (Albert P. Blaustein & 
Robert L. Zangrando eds., Northwestern Univ. Press 1991) (1968); see also Lea S. 
VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 484–
85 (1989) (explaining this quote in the context of Congress’s goal of achieving free labor). 
 260. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 156 (1866); see also VanderVelde, supra 
note 259, at 485–86. 
 261. The Worst Enemies of the South, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1866, at 4. 
 262. The Freedmen’s Celebration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1866, at 1. 
 263. The Compromise of 1877 settled the disputed presidential election of 1876.  In the 
traditional interpretation of the compromise, Congress agreed to end Reconstruction in 
exchange for selection of Rutherford B. Hayes as President. See, e.g., AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 65, at 351–52. 
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nationwide trusts, the great Standard Oil Trust of Rockefeller (1882), the 
American Cotton Oil Trust (1884), the National Linseed Oil Trust (1885), 
the National Lead Trust (1887), and the Whiskey and Sugar Trusts 
(1889).264  Congressional debates of the 1890s show marked concern with 
widespread cartelization, rate-setting, and wealth concentration in the 
American economy.265  As a result, Congress began, slowly, to see 
government regulation of these private collectives as a necessary market 
corrective—a way of ensuring that the market would, in fact, function 
fairly.266 
But Congress did not fashion this new regulation of private collectives 
from whole cloth.  The idea of legislating against private parties as a 
mechanism to preserve “economic opportunity, security of property, 
freedom of exchange, and political liberty,”267 found its antecedent in 
Congress’s “efforts to safeguard the fundamental rights of former slaves 
through the Reconstruction Amendments and related legislation.”268  The 
namesake of the Sherman Antitrust Act, Senator John Sherman, for 
instance, was himself a member of the Reconstruction Congress,269 as were 
at least a handful of his congressional colleagues.  Senator George 
Edmunds, the primary drafter of the Sherman Antitrust Act had managed 
the Reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan Act for the Senate.270  And Senator 
George Frisbie Hoar, another principal draftsman of the Antitrust Act,271 
had personally petitioned President Ulysses S. Grant to seek civil rights 
legislation when Hoar served as the Republican representative from 
Massachusetts.272  As if to emphasize the point, legislators used shopworn 
metaphors of “slavery” and “liberty” when talking about the effect of 
economic centralization, just as they had used these terms to describe 
 
 264. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960:  
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 80 (1992).  
 265. DONALD DEWEY, THE ANTITRUST EXPERIMENT IN AMERICA 4 (1990). 
 266. At least initially, Congress’s antitrust effort “reflected the still widely shared 
orthodox laissez-faire position that industrial concentration was an unnatural interference 
with the law of free competition and could be achieved only through conspiracy or illicit 
financial manipulation.” HORWITZ, supra note 264, at 80–81.  Only later did some 
economists begin to persuade policy makers that anticompetitive consolidation could occur 
because of, rather than despite, classical laissez-faire economics. See Horwitz, supra note 
254, at 1428 (“Private power began to become increasingly indistinguishable from public 
power precisely at the moment, late in the nineteenth century, when large-scale corporate 
concentration became the norm. The attack on the public/private distinction was the result of 
a widespread perception that so-called private institutions were acquiring coercive power 
that had formerly been reserved to governments.”). 
 267. James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era:  Political and Economic Theory in 
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880–1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 288 (1989). 
 268. Id. at 289 (footnote omitted). 
 269. Id. at 288 n.271. 
 270.  See David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:  Interpretive Approach 
and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 547 n.360 (1992). 
 271.  See Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 
699 (1991). 
 272. David Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of Villainy”:  The Unknown History of 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 43–44. 
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Southern oppression in the 1860s and 70s.  Senator John Sherman 
“proclaimed his proposal ‘a bill of rights, a charter of liberty’ designed to 
protect ‘the industrial liberty of the citizens of these States.’”273  According 
to Senator Sherman, “industrial liberty . . . lies at the foundation of the 
equality of all rights and privileges.”274 
Even as late as 1906, President William Howard Taft remarked that the 
Act had saved the nation from a potential “plutocracy” and that the freedom 
advanced by antitrust ideals was, “in its broadest and proper sense, . . . 
freedom from personal restraint, right of free labor, right of property, right 
of religious worship, [and] right of contract”275—those same freedoms that 
had so animated the debates around the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Thus did the end of Reconstruction midwife the 
beginning of antitrust. 
III.  THE LEGACY OF JONES 
A.  Death 
For the Joneses, the celebrity of being a caption in Supreme Court history 
did not protect them from the grind or the tragedy of ordinary life.  When 
the Supreme Court issued its decision, Barbara Jo was working as an East 
St. Louis social worker.  She was also four months pregnant.  Joseph Lee 
had taken the déclassé job of a bail bondsman.276  Meanwhile, his teenage 
daughter from a previous marriage had moved in with the family.277  A 
week after the decision, the Post-Dispatch reported that all the Paddock 
Woods homes had been sold and that the market price of comparable homes 
had “risen considerably from the $28,500 that the Joneses were prepared to 
pay in 1965.”278  The Joneses never were able to buy a house in the 
Paddock Woods development.  “[D]iscouraged by long court delays,” the 
Joneses had instead bought a less expensive ranch-style home in a nearby 
development.279 
In 1971, the Joneses divorced.  Barbara Jo moved with their five-year-old 
daughter, Christine, to Las Vegas.280  Joseph Lee remained in the St. Louis 
area. 
On Friday night, May 17, 1974, J.D. Jones, Joseph Lee’s younger sibling 
and housemate, told the police that he had discovered his brother dead in 
 
 273. May, supra note 267, at 289–90 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2457, 2461 (1890) 
(statements of Sen. Sherman)). 
 274. Id. at 290 (quoting 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statements of Sen. Sherman)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 275. Id. at 302 (quoting WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT & THE SUPREME 
COURT 4, 37 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (1914)). 
 276. Attorney in Housing Case Elated, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 17, 1968, at 1A. 
 277. Couple’s House Hunt Is Still On, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 23, 1968, at 13A. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Bleck, supra note 29.  
 280. Id. 
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the dining room of their house.  Joseph Lee had suffered multiple stab 
wounds to the abdomen.281  Less than two days later, J.D. admitted to 
police that he had stabbed his brother to death after an argument.282 
Despite the triumph of the Jones litigation and the trumpet of progress 
from its advocates, the St. Louis metro area remained and remains heavily 
segregated.  According to the Harvard School of Public Health, in the year 
2000, 73% of non-Hispanic African Americans still live in segregated 
neighborhoods.283  African Americans live in neighborhoods in which 
twenty-two percent of their neighbors are impoverished.284  Meanwhile, the 
Paddock Woods development prospered and expanded, and now boasts 
homes valued at over $200,000.285 
B.  Near-Death 
Jones’s insight about the functional relationship between private and 
public power gave rise to four decisions of note:  two dealing with another 
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866—42 U.S.C. § 1981286—and two 
dealing with the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment itself.  In each of these 
cases the Court struggled with the tension Jones had created between 
Congress’s broad remedial authority in Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the elliptical terms of its prohibitions in Section 1. 
In Runyon v. McCrary,287 a private school in Arlington, Virginia refused 
to accept black applicants for admission.  Plaintiffs brought a class action 
against the school alleging that their admissions policy violated the portions 
of the 1866 Act, recodified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, that guarantee all persons 
the same right “to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.”288  Justice Stewart, over the dissents of Justices White and 
William Rehnquist, wrote for the majority.  To him there was a 
commonsense equivalence between Runyon and Jones: 
Just as in Jones a Negro’s § 1 right to purchase property on equal terms 
with whites was violated when a private person refused to sell to the 
 
 281. Man Slain in Home in Florissant, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 18, 1974, at 1A. 
 282. Younger Brother Charged with Killing J.L. Jones, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 
19, 1974, at 3A. 
 283. St. Louis, MO—IL – Metropolitan Quality of Life Data, Residential Integration and 
Neighborhood Characteristics:  Segregation of the Population:  Dissimilarity with Non-
Hispanic Whites by Race/Ethnicity, 2000, http://diversitydata.sph.harvard.edu/profiles. 
jsp?ma=7040 (last visited Nov. 19, 2008) (citing 2000 U.S. Census Bureau statistics). 
 284. St. Louis, MO—IL – Metropolitan Quality of Life Data, Residential Integration and 
Neighborhood Characteristics:  Exposure to Neighborhood Poverty by Race/Ethnicity, 1999, 
http://diversitydata.sph.harvard.edu/profiles.jsp?ma=7040 (last visited Nov. 19, 2008) (citing 
2000 U.S. Census Bureau statistics).  Compare this with the 90.5% in 1960. See Casper, 
supra note 22, at 91. 
 285. St. Louis County, Real Estate Information, http://revenue.stlouisco.com/ias/ (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2008). 
 286.  42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). 
 287. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 288. Id. at 170.  An association of local private schools with similar racially 
discriminatory admissions policies also intervened. 
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prospective purchaser solely because he was a Negro, so also a Negro’s § 
1 right to “make and enforce contracts” is violated if a private offeror 
refuses to extend to a Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the same 
opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees.289 
Justices Lewis Powell and John Paul Stevens concurred with reservations.  
Stevens expressed his “firm[] belie[f]” that Jones and its progeny “have 
been incorrectly decided.”290  But for both Powell and Stevens, the power 
of stare decisis was dispositive:  had they been writing on a “clean slate,” 
they would have voted to reverse.291 
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,292 the Court answered the question 
of whether discrimination in employment after the contract has been 
consummated falls within the proscription of § 1981.  Brenda Patterson, a 
credit union employee, claimed racial harassment at work, harassment that 
ultimately led to her termination.293  The Court concluded, again, that § 
1981 covered private contracts, but only discrimination in their formation 
not in their postformation performance.294  Patterson could not use the Act 
to allege discrimination in the conditions of her employment.  Congress 
subsequently amended § 1981 to cover postformation conduct, as well as 
clarify that it applies to private as well as public discrimination.295 
In Palmer v. Thompson,296 a class of black residents sued the City of 
Jackson, Mississippi after the city closed the public swimming pool, rather 
than operate it on a desegregated basis.  Justice Black, writing for the 
majority, held that the Thirteenth Amendment, of its own force, could not 
compel the Court to order Jackson to operate the swimming pool.  Any 
other construction of the Thirteenth Amendment “would severely stretch its 
short simple words and do violence to its history.”297  However, the Court 
stated in dicta that perhaps Congress’s enforcement authority could permit 
regulation of such recreational facilities.298 
In City of Memphis v. Greene,299 white residents of a Memphis 
neighborhood asked their local legislature to close a through street to traffic, 
effectively sealing off the black residents north of the neighborhood.300  
The black citizens sued, claiming that the closure violated § 1982 as well as 
the Thirteenth Amendment.301  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 
held that the record revealed no legislative intent to discriminate against the 
 
 289. Id. at 170–71. 
 290. Id. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 291. Id. at 186–87 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 292. 491 U.S. 164 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 
 293. Id. at 169–71. 
 294. See id. at 180–81. 
 295. See § 101(2), 105 Stat. at 1071–72 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)–(c) (2000)). 
 296. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 297. Id. at 226. 
 298. Id. at 227. 
 299. 451 U.S. 100 (1981). 
 300. Id. at 102. 
 301. Id.  
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black citizens, and that the disparate impact of the closure could not be 
construed under either § 1982 or the Thirteenth Amendment “as a badge or 
incident of slavery.”302  Justice White concurred, stating specifically that 
the 1866 Act required some evidence of discriminatory animus:  “nothing in 
the legislative history of this Act suggests that Congress was concerned 
with facially neutral measures which happened to have an incidental impact 
on former slaves.”303 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justices William J. Brennan and 
Blackmun, dissented.  Justice Marshall noted that, among other factors, the 
closing of the road would have the effect of increasing property values in 
the predominantly white areas, while it would cause property values in the 
predominantly black areas to decline.304  The dissent also doubted Justice 
White’s view that the 1866 Act only addressed purposeful as opposed to 
incidental discrimination.305  Finally, while disclaiming a belief that any 
disparate impact violated the Thirteenth Amendment on its own terms, 
Marshall stated that he 
would conclude that official action causing harm of the magnitude 
suffered here plainly qualifies as a “badge or incident” of slavery, at least 
as those terms were understood by the Reconstruction Congress. 
 When the Thirteenth Amendment was being debated, supporters and 
opponents alike acknowledged that it would have the effect of striking 
down racial discrimination in a wide variety of areas. . . . Consequently,    
. . . because the closing of West Drive is forbidden on these facts by § 
1982, it is a fortiori a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment as well.306 
Jones survived two brushes with death, first in the early 1970s and then 
in the mid-1980s.  In 1972, Congress considered overriding the Jones 
decision legislatively, at least as it applied to workplace discrimination.307  
Senator Roman Lee Hruska of Nebraska introduced an amendment to the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 that would have made Title 
VII and the Equal Pay Act exclusive remedies for employment 
discrimination, essentially precluding application of § 1981 to the 
workplace.308  The Senate defeated the amendment in a tie vote, but the 
 
 302. Id. at 126.  The majority did not speculate regarding the scope of disparate impact 
that may violate the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 128–29. 
 303. Id. at 134 (White, J., concurring). 
 304. Id. at 145–46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  It should be noted, however, that the basis 
of this devaluation was not on residential or commercial development opportunity, but the 
psychological effect of separating the black neighborhood off from the white neighborhood. 
Id. 
 305. Id. at 144 & n.11, 148 n.14. 
 306. Id. at 154 n.18. 
 307. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?  Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 622 (1991). 
 308. Id. 
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House took the amendment back up.  The amendment finally died in the 
conference committee.309 
In 1988, in Patterson, the Court took the unusual step of setting the case 
for reargument.310  The Court specifically requested that the parties brief 
the question of “[w]hether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary . . . should be 
reconsidered.”311  Although Chief Justice Rehnquist spearheaded the move 
to reconsider Runyon along with Jones, his reservations had touched a 
nerve with Associate Justices White, Powell, and Sandra Day O’Connor, 
who privately voiced their own misgivings about Jones.312  Justice 
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, reacted 
vociferously.  “I am at a loss to understand the motivation of five Members 
of this Court to reconsider an interpretation of a civil rights statute that so 
clearly reflects our society’s earnest commitment to ending racial 
discrimination, and in which Congress so evidently has acquiesced.”313  
Stevens wrote separately, arguing that the decision to reargue a “well 
established” case of statutory interpretation had “replace[d] what is ideally a 
sense of guaranteed right with the uneasiness of unsecured privilege.”314  
Jones survived again, mostly due to stare decisis.315 
Jones’s reputation among scholars, legislators, and jurists as a watershed 
moment in civil rights jurisprudence has waxed and waned.  George 
Rutherglen, for example, sees Jones as an example of judicial caution.  He 
argues that the Court deliberately severed the state action thread in Jones in 
favor of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power because the 
alternative—a Shelley-like application of the state action doctrine to the 
facts of Jones—would have stretched that doctrine to the breaking point.316  
He goes on to suggest that while Jones appears to be a breathtaking 
expansion of federal power over private conduct, in reality, it is a modest 
extension of a Civil War-era statute, whose reach comports with notions of 
 
 309. Id. (citing 118 CONG. REC. 3172–73 (1972) (statement of Sen. Hruska); 117 CONG. 
REC. 31,973 (1971) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn)). 
 310. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988); see Bernard Schwartz, 
Rehnquist, Runyon, and Jones—the Chief Justice, Civil Rights, and Stare Decisis, 31 TULSA  
L.J. 251, 256–57 (1995). 
 311. Patterson, 485 U.S. at 617; see also Schwartz, supra note 310, at 251. 
 312. Schwartz, supra note 310, at 256–57. 
 313. Patterson, 485 U.S. at 621 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 314. Id. at 622 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 315. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171–75 (1989), superseded by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (explaining the 
doctrine of stare decisis and why its policy decisions do not counsel abrogation of the 
Court’s prior precedent).  Congress subsequently amended the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to 
make explicit that § 1981 applies to nongovernmental as well as governmental actors. See 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101(2), 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)–(c) (2000)). 
 316. See Rutherglen, supra note 17, at 332 (“[T]he implications of any decision 
expanding the state action doctrine to reach the claim in Jones v. Mayer would have been 
startling, transforming a wide range of conduct previously thought to be entirely private into 
state action subject to the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
MILLER AFTER BP 12/7/2009  1:46:04 PM 
2008] HISTORY OF JONES v. ALFRED H. MAYER CO. 1043 
federal government power Congress had already shown itself willing to 
exercise in the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts.317 
By contrast, scholars such as G. Sidney Buchanan, Douglas Colbert, and 
Alexander Tsesis argue that Jones worked a profound change in the legal 
landscape.  Buchanan has written that the Jones decision would permit 
Congress to use the Thirteenth Amendment to regulate all types of arbitrary 
class prejudice, not simply prejudice based on race.318  Tsesis has 
contended that Jones is potentially as important a case for the Thirteenth 
Amendment as Brown was for the Fourteenth.319 
The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.  Without question, 
Jones signaled a bold departure from a state action doctrine that was fast 
losing its intellectual appeal.  However, Jones as a catalyst for 
transformation of the basis of civil rights legislation and litigation has yet to 
materialize.320  In large part, this is because the Court has consistently 
ducked the issue of how much of slavery’s “badges and incidents” the 
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits of its own accord, how much Congress is 
permitted to prohibit under its enforcement power, and whom the 
Amendment protects from the “badges and incidents” of slavery.321  The 
reasons for the lacunae are unclear, but easily imagined.322  Consequently, 
Congress has lapsed into its more certain sources of authority like the 
Commerce Clause, and litigants have appealed to reliable and predictable 
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment and its enforcement 
legislation. 
 
 317. Id. at 335.  George Rutherglen goes on to remark that Jones’s interpretation of the 
1866 Act sweeps only a little further than the 1964 and 1968 Acts, “[i]ronically, [making the 
expanded coverage of the 1866 Act] acceptable . . . because it [is] so insignificant.” Id. 
 318. See BUCHANAN, supra note 201, at 179–89. 
 319. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 82 
(2004); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 29, 53 (1995) (arguing that Jones revived the broad purpose of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and encouraging a new commitment to Thirteenth Amendment scholarship and 
instruction in legal academia). 
 320. See Douglas L. Colbert, Affirming the Thirteenth Amendment, 1995 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 403, 404 (lamenting that the Thirteenth Amendment’s “underutilization 
prevails today, when the amendment’s creative and meaningful application is needed more 
than ever”). 
 321. William Carter, for instance, has observed that lower courts seldom find violations 
of the “badges and incidents” of slavery.  Instead, they almost uniformly approach the 
Thirteenth Amendment as limited solely to involuntary servitude. See Carter, supra note 
212, at 1315 & n.10. 
 322. One reason may be ordinary jurisprudential canons of constitutional avoidance; 
another may be path dependency that began with the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 
1960s.  Certainly, attempting to directly trace a certain discriminatory phenomenon to the 
legacy of slavery presents significant sociological, historiographical, and political 
challenges.  Finally, as a matter of political psychology, only a small portion of the voting 
public sees any utility in rubbing open the scabbed sore of America’s slave history. 
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Therefore, despite Jones’s bold premise and latent promise, it has never 
grabbed the popular imagination like Brown.  Nor has it galvanized the civil 
rights bar like Monroe v. Pape.323  But that could be changing. 
C.  Resurrection? 
Progressive quarters of the legal academy concerned about the impact of 
the Rehnquist Court’s new federalism decisions,324 the resurgent interest in 
associational rights after Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,325 the reactionary 
popular defense of private property after Kelo v. City of New London,326 
and the potential curbing of sixties-era civil rights protection in the Roberts 
Court have begun to look at Jones, the Thirteenth Amendment, and its 
enforcement legislation with fresh eyes.327  Just as the Judiciary Act of 
1789 is considered a guide to the meaning of Article III,328 the 1866 Act 
can guide interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment.329  In this respect, 
the functional purpose of the 1866 Act is an indicator of the scope and 
meaning of Congress’s authority to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. 
As an absolute floor, the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes legislation 
passed directly against private parties who require service from others under 
 
 323. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). It is generally accepted that Monroe v. Pape broke open the 
Constitution to claims of violations by state and municipal officers.  Prior to that, the statute 
“was remarkable for its insignificance”; indeed, it appears that prior to 1920, only twenty-
one lawsuits were brought under § 1983. See CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS:   ENFORCING THE 
CONSTITUTION 42 (John C. Jeffries, Jr., Pamela S. Karlan, Peter W. Low & George A. 
Rutherglen eds., 2d ed. 2007) (citing Comment, The Civil Rights Act:  Emergence of an 
Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951)). See generally Colbert, supra 
note 320. 
 324. See supra note 16. 
 325. 530 U.S. 640 (2000); see Epstein, supra note 17, at 142; cf. Bernstein, supra note 17, 
at 139. 
 326. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 327. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 
403 (1993) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment might have required protection of a 
child against private abuse in the case of DeShaney v. Winnebego County Department of 
Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)); Lawrence G. Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court 
Regarding the Missing Argument in Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 156–57 
(2000) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to pass the Violence 
Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981); Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom:  
Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 308 (2004) (“My contention 
is that the Thirteenth Amendment ended all aspects of slavery, which spread far outside the 
boundaries of plantation husbandry into interstate commerce, government fiscal policy, and 
private sales transactions.”); Marcellene Elizabeth Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth 
Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1098 
(1998). 
 328. See William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment:  A 
Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1384 n.76 (1989) (citing William R. Casto, 
The First Congress’s Understanding of Its Authority over the Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 
26 B.C. L. REV. 1101, 1103, 1125–26 (1985)). 
 329. See FONER, supra note 202, at 244 (“In constitutional terms, the Civil Rights bill 
represented the first attempt to give meaning to the Thirteenth Amendment . . . .”); John 
Hope Franklin, The Civil Rights Act of 1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1142 (1990); 
Kaczorowski, supra note 19, at 863–64. 
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circumstances approximating African slavery.330  However, the debates 
over the 1866 Act also support a broader construction of what the 
Thirteenth Amendment authorizes, and has implications for lingering 
questions surrounding state action, disparate impact versus disparate 
treatment, and the respective roles of Congress and courts in interpreting 
the amendment. 
Jones makes clear that the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to 
prohibit racialized cartel behavior.  Congress had evidence of whites across 
the economic spectrum who refused to deal with blacks on an equal basis.  
Although the 1866 Act certainly addressed this cartel behavior sanctioned 
by the affirmative enactments of state and local governments, it also 
recognized it as a problem of aggregated private behavior. 
However, the precise analogies with cartel behavior should not be 
overemphasized.  This Article does not mean to suggest that the existing 
antitrust doctrine should be imported wholesale to civil rights litigation.331  
Evidence of racialized cartel-like behavior is a sufficient, but not a 
necessary, predicate for appropriate congressional action under the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Congress can use its Thirteenth Amendment 
enforcement power to prevent individual and isolated instances of racial 
discrimination, if it can rationally determine that isolated instances of 
discrimination, if aggregated over a broad spectrum of persons, would have 
the effect of locking out African Americans from valuable social, economic, 
or political opportunities.  In this respect, Congress’s Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power would be in harmony with the Supreme 
Court’s construction of Congress’s Commerce Clause power in cases like 
Wickard v. Filburn332 and the more recent Gonzalez v. Raich.333 
This analytical framework has three benefits.  First, it restores the 
Thirteenth Amendment to its appropriate place in civil rights enforcement.  
By relying expressly on the Thirteenth Amendment, rather than the 
Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress places the idea 
of racial equality and racial redress back at the center of its remedial and 
constitutional agenda.334  Second, Congress’s ability to craft prophylactic 
legislation under the Thirteenth Amendment currently is not constrained to 
 
 330. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988).  In this case involving forced 
labor of two retarded individuals, the Court found it clear that Congress has the power to 
enforce the Thirteenth Amendment against private persons; it could do so in a criminal 
context only when the service is compelled by physical coercion or threat of law, not by 
psychological compulsion. Id. 
 331. For example, this Article does not propose that direct evidence of actual agreement 
would be required for Congress constitutionally to proscribe racialized cartel behavior, nor 
does it propose that racially discriminatory cartel behavior could be excused by a “rule of 
reason” in practice.  Finally, the beneficiaries of this approach are not primarily consumers, 
but African Americans who are locked out of competition. 
 332. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 333. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 334. See, e.g., Tsesis, supra note 327, at 340 (noting that Jones recognizes that the 
Thirteenth Amendment can be used directly against private persons who discriminate and 
“need not operate behind a veil of congressional power over interstate commerce”). 
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the same extent as it is under the Fourteenth Amendment.335  Third, this 
framework actually helps create manageable standards for Congress.  The 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power is powerful medicine. 
Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment is potentially very 
broad,336 and for that reason judicial oversight is essential337—not only for 
fear of congressional overreaching, but for protection of the integrity of the 
amendment itself.  To paraphrase William Carter, if Congress can make a 
“badge and incident” of slavery mean everything, it will mean nothing.338  
The standards for legitimate congressional authority should be conceived of 
as a sliding scale.  Congressional legislation that targets traditional features 
of slavery or involuntary servitude339 is a presumptively valid exercise of 
Thirteenth Amendment authority.  Congressional legislation that targets 
acts or disabilities that resemble historic incidents of slavery and which are 
applied to discrete, insular, and identifiable minorities with a history of 
compelled service in America are given a low threshold of reasonableness 
analysis.  Congressional legislation that targets private behavior directed at 
these same minorities, which, if aggregated over large groups, would lead 
to cartel-like or lock-out effects, either from an economic or social capital 
 
 335. This limitation has two components:  First, the requirement that legislation passed 
under the Fourteenth Amendment target state actors, rather than private actors. See, e.g., 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
Second, the suggestion that Congress can only legislate to protect federal rights that the 
Supreme Court has already recognized in the Constitution or as incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Bd. of 
Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62 (2000). 
 336. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-13 (2d ed. 1988) 
(“Seemingly, Congress is free, within the broad limits of reason, to recognize whatever 
rights it wishes, define the infringement of those rights as a form of domination and thus an 
aspect of slavery, and proscribe such infringement as a violation of the [T]hirteenth 
[A]mendment.”). 
 337. For instance, it would be troublesome if Congress were to use its Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power to, for example, dictate to couples that they had to marry 
across racial lines, or to curtail their ability to make such choices, by, for example, passing a 
law forbidding racial designations in personal ads.  Although racial preferences in marriage 
have a disparate effect on minorities, personal choices in one’s mate, unlike personal choices 
in one’s work colleagues or country club memberships, do not fall within the kind of social 
benefits or economic benefits that the Thirteenth Amendment doctrine can reach.  A harder 
question, discussed below, is whether the Thirteenth Amendment could be used to proscribe 
certain selection options in one’s child bearing. 
 338. William Carter made a similar remark during a symposium on the Thirteenth 
Amendment at the University of Toledo Law School. See Carter, supra note 212, at 1317 
(arguing that a view of the Thirteenth Amendment as “providing a generalized constitutional 
remedy for all forms of discrimination” ignores history and risks devaluing the potential of 
the amendment to provide an effective remedy); Tsesis, supra note 327, at 310 (noting that 
an interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment cannot neglect history).  In this regard, I am 
somewhat sympathetic to the theory, but not the application, of the Court’s power to prevent 
Congress from redefining a constitutional right under the guise of enforcing it. See Boerne, 
521 U.S. at 519. 
 339. Such as peonage, 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2006), physical compulsion for labor, id. § 
1589; see also id. § 1594 (authorizing civil forfeiture actions against violators of some 
provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583–1584, 1589–1590). 
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perspective, satisfy Congress’s prophylactic power to prohibit “badges and 
incidents” of slavery.340  Conceived of as a graph, with the type of behavior 
following the x-axis and the category of person following the y-axis, the 
power of the courts and Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment would 
look like the graph below.341 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Those portions of the graph where the shading is darkest correspond to 
judicial authority to proscribe a certain behavior under the Thirteenth 
Amendment standing alone.  Those portions of the graph where the shading 
is slightly lighter represent the area in which courts may find “constitutional 
preemption” of certain private acts, as Mark Rosen has aptly described.342  
 
 340. In this sense, my analysis of the power of Congress under the Thirteenth 
Amendment supplements Professor Carter’s excellent treatment of the issue.  Professor 
Carter argues that a “badge or incident” of slavery requires a nexus between the history of 
the group and the nature of the injury.  “[A]s the group’s link to slavery grows more 
attenuated, the nature of the injury must be more strongly connected to the system of slavery 
to be rationally considered a badge or incident thereof.” Carter, supra note 212, at 1318.  My 
analysis, however, adds the requirement that there be some evidence that the behavior, if 
sufficiently prevalent, would have the effect of locking out African Americans from 
political, social, or economic opportunity. 
 341. This Article is indebted to Professor Carter’s and Professor Rosen’s articulation of 
the issues regarding this idea.  The graph attempts to visually represent their insight. 
 342. See Rosen, supra note 51, at 492–98.  Rosen’s notion of “constitutional preemption” 
is supported by Gilded Age legal commentator John W. Burgess, who wrote in 1890 that 
“‘[t]here is no doubt that those who framed the [T]hirteenth and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments 
intended to occupy the whole ground [of the area of civil liberties] and thought that they had 
done so.  The opposition charged that these amendments would nationalize the whole sphere 
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Those portions of the graph where the shading is the lightest represent areas 
in which Congress has sufficient authority under its enforcement power and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause to legislate in favor of civil rights.  And, 
those portions of the graph where there is little to no shading represent areas 
in which Congress would be unable to legislate under its Thirteenth 
Amendment authority.343 
Next, what Jones gropes at, but does not ultimately address, is that the 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power is as much an amendment that 
enables Congress to remedy private and state government inaction as much 
as it is an amendment designed to remedy private and state government 
action.  At its most basic, this means that Congress may use the Thirteenth 
Amendment to address problems of disparate impact as much as disparate 
treatment.  At its most active, the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes 
Congress to abrogate state sovereignty and permits suits for money 
damages directly against the state.344  Moreover, in contrast to cases such as 
Printz v. United States345 and Alden v. Maine,346 Jones also suggests that 
Congress has the authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to compel 
state officials to act in areas where they have refused to so as long as that 
refusal to act results in a “badge and incident of slavery.”  For instance, in 
Palmer,347 the city of Jackson, Mississippi closed the municipal swimming 
pools altogether, rather than operate them on a desegregated basis.  The 
Court may not be able to order Jackson, Mississippi to reopen and operate a 
desegregated swimming pool.348  However, as a remedial measure, 
Congress may be able to do just such a thing.349 
 
of civil liberty; the majority accepted the view; and the legislation of Congress for their 
elaboration and enforcement proceeded upon that view.’” Sheffer, supra note 254, at 48 
(emphasis added) (quoting 1 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 225 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 1890)). 
 343. Although this does not suggest that Congress would not have power under the 
Commerce Clause, Spending Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, or other authority.  
Furthermore, the graph does not specifically capture the ability of Congress to prevent 
retaliation against whites, for instance, for supporting the rights of African Americans. 
 344. Lower courts have held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and its ilk have not clearly abrogated 
state sovereignty. See, e.g., Keri v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 458 F.3d 620, 640 (7th Cir. 
2006); Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 423 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2005); Powers v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1303 (S.D. Ala. 2000).  While that conclusion is subject 
to challenge, it cannot be gainsaid that Congress could, by express intention under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, authorize money damages against the states, just as it has through 
Title VII. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456–57 (1976) (holding that Title VII is a 
valid abrogation of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit). 
 345. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 346. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 347. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 348. Indeed, in the modern area of public choice theory, it may well be impossible for any 
court to come to a conclusion that a deliberative body decided to close the swimming pool 
“because” of invidious racism. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND 
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) (demonstrating how it is impossible to know the 
preferences of any deliberative body by identification of each member’s individual 
preferences). 
 349. See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226–27. 
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This antitrust approach to Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power, 
tempered, as already indicated, by the necessity to tie such power to a 
legacy of slavery, potentially gives Congress new tools to legislate in areas 
where racial minorities suffer disparate impact, but where the Commerce 
Clause power or Fourteenth Amendment power are lacking.  For example, 
federal courts have routinely upheld state felon disenfranchisement and 
civil disability laws against Fourteenth Amendment challenge.350  Further, 
these laws disproportionately affect the rights of African Americans and 
Latinos.  However, neither the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth 
Amendment empowers Congress to supersede these laws if they are neutral 
on their face and passed without discriminatory intent351—even if the 
resulting disenfranchisement disproportionately affect these minorities.352   
Therefore, Congress, recognizing the disparate impact of felony 
disenfranchisement laws on minorities, even apart from discriminatory 
intent, could legislate using the Thirteenth Amendment353 to blunt the 
pernicious effects of these laws.354 
The Thirteenth Amendment could also be used to legislatively support 
voluntary race-conscious affirmative action plans that otherwise run afoul 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.355  An essential component of slavery was 
both the de jure and de facto prohibition on educating the slave in any 
significant sense.356  One can easily imagine a legislative agenda, supported 
 
 350. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (holding that it is not a 
Fourteenth Amendment violation to exclude felons who have completed their sentences from 
the franchise). 
 351. Cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).  In Hunter v. Underwood, the Court 
held that an ostensibly race-neutral felony disenfranchisement law that was passed 
specifically because it would disproportionately affect African Americans was 
unconstitutional.  Its subsequent use by felons seeking to invalidate other disenfranchisement 
laws has not been successful. See Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998); R.A. 
Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark:  Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 803, 919 (2004) (noting the “curtail[ment]” of the utility of Hunter in other felon 
disenfranchisement cases). 
 352. See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1260–61 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 353. Such legislation could be passed in combination with the Fifteenth Amendment as 
well. See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment:  Reflections on the Racial 
Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1904 (1999).  George Fletcher suggests that both 
the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments may invalidate these felon disenfranchisement 
laws on their face; this author does not take that point of view.  However, at a minimum, 
such a federal civil rights restoration bill for felons could be authorized under Section 2 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 354. Congress should use such a remedial power under the Thirteenth Amendment 
wisely; for example, I do not mean to suggest that Congress should (if it ever would) use the 
Thirteenth Amendment to restore the rights of a former felon to possess a firearm.  Nor do I 
mean to suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment could be used on its own to invalidate such 
felon disarmament statutes. 
 355. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 
(2007) (plurality decision holding that voluntary integration programs in elementary and 
secondary schools that used race as a factor violate the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 356. See I. Bennett Capers, Reading Back, Reading Black, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 19–20 
(2006) (recounting stories of blacks tortured, mutilated, and killed by their masters for 
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strongly by this history, that would enable Congress to pass laws permitting 
individuals and school districts to voluntarily integrate their school districts 
as a remedy for the disparate impact of private residential housing patterns. 
More speculative, but of growing concern, would be a Thirteenth 
Amendment legislative effort to proscribe so called “designer babies.”  
Medical professionals are already using sex selection techniques to allow 
individuals to choose the gender of their offspring.357  Other types of 
selection may be possible in the near future, including racial selection.  The 
problem this presents is that individual reproductive preferences may have 
society-wide repercussions—as, for example, is occurring in some parts of 
the world today with endemic gender imbalance due to parental sex 
selection.358  Congress could use the Thirteenth Amendment to proscribe 
the most egregious types of this “commodification” of offspring.359 
CONCLUSION 
Jones, like its namesake, has too long been relegated to a squib in a 
casebook, a yellowed press clipping.  It has been regarded as sui generis, an 
historical anomaly, a will-o’-the-wisp that came from nothing and leads to 
nowhere.  But it need not, and should not, remain that way.  The trail that 
Joseph Lee and Barbara Jo Jones cut when they first went to Paddock 
Woods should not be left untended.  Forty years later, it is time for scholars, 
legislators, and lawyers to retrace the Joneses’ steps, husband their path, 
and see what new courses we may chart through the wilderness that is 
America’s legacy of slavery. 
 
teaching themselves or others to read); Paul Finkelman, The Strange Career of Race 
Discrimination in Antebellum Ohio, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 373, 390 (2004). 
 357.  See Claudia Kalb, Brave New Babies, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 2004, at 45, 45–46. 
 358. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, BEYOND THERAPY:  BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 
THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 59–61 (2003), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/ 
beyondtherapy/beyond_therapy_final_webcorrected.pdf.  One can conceive other scenarios:  
for example, a widespread preference for blue-eyed and blond children; a preference for 
children skilled in music and mathematics; or a preference for children who are well-
behaved, or tall.  The permutations are nearly endless, and the consequences unsettling. 
 359. For an interesting discussion of the issue, including the application of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the problem, see Note, Regulating Eugenics, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (2008). 
